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ABSTRACT 
The Navy envisions dynamic development process for doctrine that produces 
accessible, timely, and relevant doctrine for the Fleet. The Navy Warfare Development 
Command (NWDC) in Newport, RI, recently has implemented information technology 
tools in the doctrine development process, creating the concept of Web-Enabled Doctrine. 
This thesis analyzes Web-Enabled Doctrine as the next step forward in the evolution of a 
dynamic doctrine process. 
This thesis presents an historical study of doctrine in the U.S. Navy, a description 
of the Navy's doctrine development process over the past three decades, and an evalution 
of the current system with respect to the characteristics of a dynamic process. Data on the 
current process and Web initiatives were gathered through interviews with current and 
former NWDC staff members. 
The results indicate that NWDC has increased the level of responsiveness in the 
process, thus improving the relevance and timeliness of doctrine. Recommendations are 
made for increased accessibility to the system and the migration towards emerging 
commercial Web standards (XML). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been proved again and again that nothing is more fatal than 'waiting 
for orders'. - Rear Admiral David Beatty, Commander of Admiral Sir 
John Jellicoe's Battle Cruiser Fleet, days before the Battle of Jutland [Ref. 
l:p. 137]. 
PURPOSE 
RADM Beatty's quote, though uttered in 1916, has never been more true than in 
today's high-volume, high-speed, information-packed battle space. The speed at which 
current technology allows data to be collected and disseminated has compressed the 
modern naval commander's decision cycle such that any hesitation in that cycle can be 
disastrous. A commander's efforts in this cycle should be focused on the evaluation and 
analysis of the data he or she receives, not on what to do with the information once it has 
been processed. Once the commander obtains situational awareness, the proper 
application of tactics to that situation should be evident immediately. An officer versed 
in well-developed, relevant doctrine will have such an instinctive response to tactical 
situations. The key ingredient in this recipe for battle space success is doctrine. 
Without doctrine, commanders are forced to add the time-consuming, 
intellectually intensive step of synthesizing a proper course of action given an existing 
tactical situation. The average naval officer may possess the capacity for original 
strategic or tactical thought, but it is not an ability that should be tested under combat 
pressure.  Military genius is a rare phenomenon.  The assumption that all naval officers 
possess this trait in large enough proportion to function without standing doctrine courts 
failure in battle. Doctrine does not eliminate the need for a commander's intelligence or 
judgment, but it allows quick reactions drawn from a trusted knowledge base. 
Doctrine must be accessible, timely, current, and clearly defined to be effective. If 
doctrine lacks just one of these attributes, it will not be effectively employed by the 
officers it is designed to support. For doctrine to have the desired effect, officers must be 
indoctrinated with it. Officers must know that doctrine exists, that it addresses current 
threats and capabilities, and that it has been successfully proven in combat or combat-like 
situations. Doctrine must also be clear and concise. If doctrine is not readily accessible, 
relevant, up-to-date, or understandable, commanders will not trust it, much less rely on it 
when lives are on the line. 
This study examines the evolution of naval doctrine and the doctrine development 
process within the U. S. Navy. Over the past decade, the Navy has shown an increased 
interest in formalized doctrine. The importance of effective doctrine has been recognized 
and the desire to create such doctrine has been expressed at the highest levels of the 
Navy's organization. The question now facing the Navy is how to create a dynamic 
development process that produces and installs trusted doctrine in its fighting forces. The 
answer may be found in the Navy's own history, or it may lie in the promise of new 
technology. These areas will be explored, with the intent of generating insights that will 
aid in the development ofthat process. 
B.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary: 
•    Is Web-Enabled Doctrine a step forward in the evolution of a dynamic 
development process for naval doctrine? 
2. Secondary: 
What is doctrine? 
What is the role of doctrine in naval warfare? 
How has naval doctrine evolved throughout the history of the U.S. Navy? 
How has the doctrine development process evolved throughout the history of 
the U.S. Navy? 
What is the current doctrine development process? 
What is a "dynamic development process?" 
How has Web-Enabled Doctrine been implemented in the development 
process? 
What   is   the   process   for   a   user   to   access   publications   and   make 
recommendations using the Web-Enabled Doctrine? 
Is Web-Enabled Doctrine more of a dissemination tool or a collection tool? 
Do current technological limitations prevent Web-Enabled Doctrine from 
being used as intended? 
Does current policy prevent Web-Enabled Doctrine from being used as 
intended? 
What is the vision for Web-Enabled Doctrine's future? 
C.       THESIS OUTLINE    , 
This study begins with an in-depth look at the theory of doctrine in chapter two. 
The research for this portion of the study consisted of a literature review of magazine 
articles, historical texts, and naval warfare publications. Several definitions of doctrine 
are explored and discussed. A distinction is made between doctrine and the related areas 
of policy, strategy, and tactics. Once the terminology has been established, the role of 
doctrine in naval warfare is addressed. The function of doctrine in a naval organization is 
examined fully. 
Chapter II continues with an analysis of the history of doctrine in the U.S. Navy. 
The research for this portion of the study consisted of a literature review of historical 
texts and magazine articles. The origins of U.S. Naval doctrine are documented through 
an exploration of the history of foreign navies. Beginning with the American Revolution 
and continuing through the birth of the Nuclear Age, major doctrinal shifts and their 
surrounding circumstances are described and analyzed. 
Chapter TU begins with the examination of the history of the doctrine development 
process over the past three decades. The research for this portion of the study consisted 
of a literature review of naval warfare publications and interviews conducted with 
personnel at the Navy Warfare Development Command and associated organizations. 
The procedures for generating and maintaining warfare and doctrinal publications by the 
Navy Tactical Doctrine Activity and the Navy Tactical Support Activity from 1973 to 
1993 are examined. The circumstances surrounding the establishment and subsequent 
disestablishment of the Naval Doctrine Command are discussed. 
The next step in the study leads to a description of the current doctrine 
development process at the Navy Warfare Development Command. The research for this 
portion of the study consisted of interviews conducted with personnel at NWDC and a 
review of internal documents at NWDC. The current organization is defined at both the 
command level and at the level of the doctrine department. The doctrine development 
process is examined at both of these levels as well. The look at NWDC concludes with a 
description of Web-Enabled Doctrine, a new tool that is hoped will greatly improve the 
doctrine development process. 
In Chapter IV, an analysis of the current process is conducted. This analysis 
addresses Web-Enabled Doctrine and how it fits into the concepts of the Web-Based 
Navy. The analysis also brings to light issues that are hindering the implementation and 
employment of Web-Enabled Doctrine. The last portion of the analysis identifies 
potential future directions for Web-Enabled Doctrine and the doctrine development 
process. 
The last chapter of this study presents conclusions and recommendations based on 
the analysis portion of the study. The conclusions are drawn from historical facts and 
observation of the current doctrine development process. Recommendations are offered 
regarding the employment of information technology in the doctrine development 
process. Areas for future study on this topic, of which there are many, are presented at 
the end of this chapter. 
D.   METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for data collection in this study was a combination of a 
literature review, personnel interviews, and a qualitative comparison analysis. The data 
for the background and history chapter were collected through a literature review of 
magazine articles, historical texts, and reference materials. The data for the chapter on 
the doctrine process were gathered through a literature review of internal documents at 
the Navy Warfare Development Command and interviews with current and former 
personnel at the command. The data for the analysis chapter were gathered through a 
qualitative comparison of the current implementation of Web-Enabled Doctrine to the 
vision for the Web-Based Navy. 
Thirteen semi-structured interviews were conducted. They lasted from 45 minutes 
to approximately 90 minutes. The interview script in the Appendix was used as a basis 
for the interviews. Former NWDC personnel were interviewed to give a perspective on 
the establishment of NWDC and past processes. Current personnel were interviewed to 
provide insight into the current doctrine process and command relationships at NWDC. 
The same basic questions were asked of all interview subjects; however, more detailed 
questions were asked in the areas of expertise of the individuals. 
E.        EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
There are three main goals of this thesis. One goal is to help remove contusion 
about doctrine by providing clear definitions of terminology and the role of doctrine in 
naval warfare. The second goal is to tell the story of doctrine in the U.S. Navy. The third 
and most important goal is to provide analysis of the current doctrine process, address 
problems in that process, and give recommendations for improvements in the process. 
The next few paragraphs discuss why these goals are important and how they will be met. 
United States naval officers seem to have an aversion to any mention of doctrine. 
Much of this stems from confusion surrounding doctrine. Terminology has been misused 
to the point that doctrine and TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) are almost 
synonymous to the average officer. The function of doctrine in naval warfare is not 
taught in Navy schoolhouses. In an attempt to alleviate these problems, this study 
provides clear definitions of terminology and an in-depth discussion of the importance of 
doctrine and its role in naval warfare. 
One of the primary goals of NWDC is to create a dynamic development process 
for naval doctrine. The current doctrine development process must evolve to meet this 
goal. A key to fostering future evolution is understanding the previous evolution and 
iterations of the process. This study tells the story of doctrine throughout the history of 
the U.S. Navy, providing a record of its evolution. 
The doctrine development process at NWDC is undergoing significant change as a 
result of the implementation of information technology.   When a process experiences 
such change, there are bound to be areas that encounter difficulty. An outsider's 
observations may identify problems overlooked by those involved in the process on a 
daily basis. This study provides an impartial look at the process. 
These three goals drive this study. At every point in this thesis, one or more are 
being directly addressed. Each of these goals is separate from, but intimately related to 
the others. The combination of the three provides a unique look at doctrine in the U.S. 
Navy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.       INTRODUCTION TO NAVAL DOCTRINE 
Military doctrine probably has existed in one form or another since the existence 
of the first military force. Some military forces have had formalized, written doctrine. 
Others have relied on tradition and informal, unwritten doctrine. The fact that doctrine 
has always existed in the military does not mean that it has always been employed 
properly. When applied too strictly, doctrine can stifle judgment and original thought, 
leading to paralysis in unfamiliar situations. Loosely applied, doctrine can be just as 
damaging by failing to provide a common ground, possibly causing units of the same 
force to work at odds with one another. Military leaders are responsible for developing 
doctrine and determining how it should best be employed. 
The development and employment of doctrine is of critical interest to leaders in 
today's Navy. The U.S. Navy has had a history of decentralized command with a high 
reliance on the judgment and capabilities of its local commanders. As a result, an 
individualistic culture has developed. In this "captain knows best" environment, doctrine 
has struggled to find a foothold. Any movement towards installing doctrine in the Navy 
must start with the very basics. These basics must include a standardized definition of 
doctrine and a clear explanation of its intended role in naval warfare. 
1.        Doctrine Defined 
Naval doctrine has been a difficult issue to address in the U.S. Navy. A primary 
reason for this difficulty is a general lack of understanding among naval officers about the 
meaning of the word doctrine. The term "doctrine" is often used interchangeably when 
referring to doctrine, TTP, or strategy. For example, every ship in the Navy has a set list 
of procedures for fighting a fire in the main engineering space, which is unfailingly titled 
the "main space firefighting doctrine (MSFD)." The MSFD clearly falls under the 
purview of TTP, but the addition of the word doctrine falsely categorizes it as "doctrine" 
in the mind of the naval officer. To avoid such misunderstandings, a clear, common 
definition of doctrine is essential if it is to be understood and used properly. 
A general definition for doctrine, found in Webster's Dictionary, is "a principle or 
position or the body of principles in a branch of knowledge or a system of belief [Ref. 
2:p. 342]." It is also defined simply as "something that is taught [Ref. 2:p. 342]." 
Looking at doctrine from an organizational perspective, it can be defined as those shared 
beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession [Ref. 3:p. 1]. The first two 
definitions describe what is contained in doctrine, while the third leans more towards 
describing the function of doctrine. The terms "knowledge" and "beliefs" are important 
in defining doctrine. Doctrine is a form of knowledge management. It is a means by 
which hard-earned knowledge is passed from one generation of professionals to the next. 
It is also the codification of a system of beliefs and principles.  It is more than a set of 
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instructions or a checklist to be followed. It ties beliefs and principles to methods and 
procedures. It tells not only what should be done, but also why it should be done. 
A perfect illustration of this concept is the Hippocratic oath taken by medical 
doctors. To this day, the medical profession uses the Hippocratic oath as its basic 
doctrine. "I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability 
and my judgment and never do harm to anyone..." is a phrase repeated by new doctors 
the world over. The exact wording and content of this oath has been modified over time, 
from the original fourth century B.C. form, to conform to changes in culture and social 
mores. In past and present versions, the duties of the doctor (prescribing regimens for the 
good of patients) are intimately combined with the implied belief that doing harm is 
immoral. Such a combination creates doctrine, and is the distinguishing trait that 
separates doctrine from procedures alone. 
A thorough definition of doctrine must include a discussion of some 
distinguishing traits of doctrine. One trait of doctrine is that it is subject to change. The 
changes can be subtle or sweeping, but they are ever present. There are many factors that 
affect doctrine. New technologies, new applications of existing technology, or scientific 
discovery can change procedures. Social values shift over time and these shifts influence 
beliefs and principles. Traumatic events such as war or other disaster can cause change in 
values and beliefs. Anything that changes procedures or principles will begin a chain 
reaction with respect to doctrine. When procedures or principles change, doctrine must 
follow so that it remains current and applicable. 
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Another unique trait of doctrine is that it is often self-regulating. In most 
professions, the communities of professionals themselves develop their own standard 
doctrine [Ref. 3:p. 1]. Society allows this as long as these communities of professionals 
do not stray too far from common beliefs. 
The preceding paragraphs give a definition and description of doctrine at a general 
level.  For military applications, this definition must be refined and some key, distinct 
aspects of military doctrine must be explained. The official definition for U.S. military 
doctrine is found in Joint Publication 1-02.  According to this publication, doctrine is: 
"fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their 
actions in support of national objectives.   It is authoritative, but requires judgment in 
application [Ref. 3:p. 2]." This definition, though technically accurate, is too broad to be 
of much use to the war fighter. A more practical definition is: 
Military doctrines are beliefs or teachings, which have been 
reasoned from principles; that is, they flow from principles as a source. 
They are intended to be general guides for the application of mutually 
accepted principles...and...a practical basis for coordination under the 
extremely difficult conditions governing contact between hostile forces 
[Ref. 4:p. 334]. 
This definition delves somewhat into the role of doctrine, which will be discussed in 
detail in the next section, but it provides a more focused view that can be understood in a 
military context. This is the definition that will be used for doctrine for the remainder of 
this paper. 
In addition to having a slightly different definition from doctrine in general, 
military doctrine differs somewhat in its attributes. One of the unique aspects of military 
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doctrine is that it breaks down into different levels and types. Military doctrine exists at 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare [Ref. 3:p. 2]. Within the U.S. 
military, there exists joint doctrine for multi-service activities, combined doctrine for 
multi-national activities, and service doctrine for each individual branch of the armed 
forces [Ref. 3:p. 2]. The level of command and the scope of the activity determine which 
type and level of doctrine is applicable (e.g. joint strategic doctrine, service tactical 
doctrine, combined operational doctrine, etc.). Because of this trait, it is imperative to 
take great care in identifying both type and level when discussing military doctrine [Ref. 
3:p. 4]. 
Another special trait of military doctrine is that it is highly susceptible, more so 
than other organizations' doctrine, to changes in a variety of factors. Changes in military 
doctrine can be driven by shifts in national policy and strategy, new technology, new 
threats, lessons learned from current and past operations, changes in government, and a 
number of other influences [Ref. 3:p. 5]. These factors affect the principles and values as 
well as the procedures contained in military doctrine. 
There is one final attribute of military doctrine that distinguishes it from other 
professions' doctrine. As mentioned earlier, the professionals within a community 
usually create and regulate their own doctrine without external influences. This is not the 
case for military doctrine. Military forces are instruments of the governments they serve. 
Military forces rely on resources provided by the government and are subject to the will 
of the people represented by that government [Ref 3:p. 2]. Society demands a certain 
level of control over an organization to which it gives its sons and daughters to be trained 
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to kill and go into harm's way [Ref. 3:p. 2]. As a result, governmental policy, made by 
civilian officials, not military professionals, is a main driver of the principles contained 
within military doctrine [Ref 3:p. 1]. Military professionals are then left to create the 
procedures concurrent with these principles, thus synthesizing military doctrine. As long 
as the government's principles concur with those of military professionals, this situation 
works fine. Once the two groups begin to diverge on principles, however, problems 
develop. Military doctrine will continue to be developed to support governmental policy, 
but its importance in the view of the war fighter may diminish. 
Naval doctrine, being a subset of military doctrine, is subject to the definition and 
attributes described above. It is important to note that the definition designated for use in 
this paper was developed by a naval officer for naval officers. Consequently, this 
definition is well-suited to naval warfare and acknowledges the important role doctrine 
should play in this arena. 
2.        Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare 
There must be a common understanding of the role of doctrine in naval warfare. 
An officer can be well versed in the definition and content of doctrine, but without the 
knowledge of how and when to employ doctrine, this knowledge is useless. The role of 
doctrine must be explicitly described and promulgated to the fleet. If its intended role is 
not defined, doctrine becomes just another publication gathering dust on a shelf. 
A simple equation for naval warfare is not easy to synthesize.   Ship for ship 
match-ups do not reveal the outcome of an engagement.    The British fleet was 
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significantly outnumbered during its 1588 defeat of the Spanish Armada [Ref. 5:p. 78]. 
Technological advantages do not guarantee victory. Merely having radar did not give 
U.S. ships any advantage in early WWII night engagements with the Japanese. Superior 
communication channels that allow a commander to relay orders and intelligence to 
subordinates do not make the ultimate difference. Nelson did not issue a single tactical 
signal after the first shot was fired at Trafalgar [Ref. l:p. 182]. In each of these examples, 
the determining factor for victory was the presence and use of naval doctrine. The British 
introduced the "line ahead" and naval artillery doctrines at the Armada battle [Ref. 5:p. 
2]; the Japanese had a well-developed doctrine for night engagements [Ref. 5:p. 135]; and 
Nelson's indoctrination of his subordinates is legendary. The conclusion drawn from 
these examples is that doctrine must play a significant role in naval warfare. The 
question that remains is: What role exactly? 
Good leadership or command is essential for success in military operations. For 
small units, a single leader can direct the actions of each individual member ofthat unit 
and maintain situational awareness. As the size of the unit increases, it is subdivided into 
smaller units with leaders at each subdivision. This creates the familiar concept of a 
"chain of command." This chain of command is a mechanism for transmitting, 
interpreting, directing, and executing instructions [Ref. 4:p. 328]. It can be thought of as 
a skeletal structure for command. For this structure to become a living, functioning 
entity, it must be "augmented by flesh and sinew and infused with spirit [Ref. 4:p. 328]." 
At a conceptual level, providing the "flesh and sinew" (procedures) and the "spirit" 
(principles) is the role of doctrine. 
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A naval combat environment often requires a subordinate unit of the organization 
to react to a situation before receiving direction through its chain of command. This 
reaction, however, must in some way be guided by the principles of the force commander. 
The subordinate officer, faced with an immediate threat or opportunity, usually does not 
have the means to obtain nor the time to await direct guidance from a superior. They 
must take action and base that action on a common understanding of the commander's 
intentions. The role of doctrine is to make these intentions known to the subordinates. 
When developed, promulgated, and used properly, doctrine will cause a subordinate to 
make the exact decision their commander, or any other officer indoctrinated by that 
commander, would make given the tactical situation. The fact that any officer in the 
command would make the same decision creates the phenomena of a "team mind" [Ref. 
4:p. 330] and provides an organic harmonization of efforts. 
For doctrine to fill this role, it must be fully understood and trusted by all officers 
in a command. This cannot be accomplished overnight. It must begin in the 
schoolhouses of the fleet and continue throughout an officer's development. Loyalty to a 
commander and the commander's plan only comes through familiarity and constant 
exposure. Full and proper indoctrination of officers must therefore occur over time [Ref. 
4:p. 331]. 
In addition to its role in command, naval doctrine has played an important role in 
developments in naval history and the emergence of revolutions in military affairs 
(RMA). It is nearly as important for the naval officer to understand this role as the 
command role. Otherwise, doctrine can lose its relevance and the emphasis placed on its 
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development and employment wanes. A revolution in military affairs occurs when there 
is a fundamental shift in military strategy, doctrine, and tactics [Ref. 5:p. 125]. A lack of 
doctrine development either can stifle an emerging RMA or lead to defeat by a force that 
has taken advantage of an RMA [Ref. 5:p. 130]. The historical model of an RMA is that 
doctrinal development lags technological development [Ref. 5:p. 130]. Technology often 
exists well before the actual RMA occurs. Only when doctrine is tied to technology is the 
puzzle completed. A force that conducts parallel technological and doctrinal 
development runs far ahead of the pack. 
The role that doctrine serves in command and warfare development has only been 
addressed in the U.S. Navy over the past decade. The importance of doctrine is only now 
being realized and emphasized, even though the impact that it has had on the history of 
the Navy is apparent from just a cursory glance at the history books. 
B.        ORIGINS OF U.S. NAVAL DOCTRINE 
A third grade student can stipulate the fact that the United States as a nation has 
its roots in Great Britain. They most likely know that several other nations also had a 
significant role in the birth and development of America as a nation. With this 
rudimentary knowledge of American History, one can make the not so distant leap of 
faith in stipulating that the U.S. Navy and its doctrine have similar origins. 
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1.        Royal Navy Roots 
It is not surprising to find that the origins of the majority of early U.S. naval 
doctrine can be traced to Great Britain's Royal Navy. At its inception, the U.S. Navy 
(then Continental Navy) was made up (like the rest of the fledgling nation) of British ex- 
patriots. It is logical that the U.S. Navy would adopt much of the doctrine of the premiere 
naval power at the time. 
The origins of U.S. naval doctrine are so closely tied to those of the Royal Navy 
that it is necessary to first look at the beginnings of its doctrine. It was King Henry Vm 
that issued Britain's first written naval doctrine around 1538 [Ref. 5:p.l]. He based his 
set of instructions on Spanish doctrine, improved upon the concepts of naval artillery 
(which paid off later during Britain's victory over the Spanish Armada), and stressed the 
importance of taking the upwind side during battle [Ref. 5:p. 1]. Both of these basic 
tenets endured throughout the age of sail. The naval broadside and the line ahead, 
developed by British privateers, quickly worked their way into informal doctrine [Ref. 
5:p. 2]. More formal doctrine would not be developed until 1636, when local 
commanders began indoctrinating subordinates with written instructions [Ref. 5:p. 3]. 
The British Parliament issued the Articles of War in 1652, which were shortly followed 
by the first written instructions from a fleet commander in 1653 [Ref. 5:p. 3]. 
Following these instructions and the Dutch-Anglo Wars, a major shift in British 
naval doctrine occurred, one that would have lasting effects until the 20th century. The 
concepts of naval artillery and massing force at sea had proven themselves in combat, and 
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resulted in a shift towards a more offensive doctrine [Ref. 5: p. 3]. In the early 1700's, a 
split among naval officers began to emerge. The meleeists were on one side, with the 
belief that breaking the line and independent maneuver could best exploit tactical 
advantages [Ref. 5:p. 4]. The other camp contained the formalists, who emphasized the 
ability of the line ahead to bring maximum firepower to bear on the enemy [Ref. 5.-p. 4]. 
In 1756, an event occurred that would further shape doctrine and its application in 
the Royal Navy. Sir John Byng was court-martialed and shot after failing to gain a 
victory over a French fleet off of Minorca [Ref. 5:p. 7]. He was shot, not for failing to 
follow existing doctrine, but for not fully exploiting an opportunity for victory [Ref. 5: p. 
8]. This led to a tendency among British naval officers to become extremely aggressive 
in attempting to exploit the smallest opportunities for victory. 
The development of offensive tactics, the acceptance of their use, and the move 
towards melee tactics signaled the aggressive nature of doctrine in the Royal Navy. The 
successes of Horatio Nelson, resulting from independent action and highly aggressive 
maneuver, only further fanned these flames. His victories at the Battle of the Nile and the 
battle of Trafalgar so impressed the Admiralty that all naval doctrine that followed was 
aimed at reclaiming that "Nelson Touch [Ref. 5:p. 18]." This led to a high emphasis on 
the offensive in British naval doctrine that was to last until World War n. It was out of 
these tendencies that the first American naval officers developed the traditions of the 
Continental Navy and its doctrine. 
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2.        Other Nations' Influences 
At its inception, the Continental Navy was significantly inferior to its main 
opponent, the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy was, at the time, the premiere maritime force 
in the world and was almost constantly engaged with contintental European powers. In 
nearly all cases, France and Spain engaged the British from a position of inferiority and 
developed doctrine to counter this disadvantage. It is only natural that the Continental 
Navy, and later the U.S. Navy, would draw on this doctrine in its struggles against the 
British. 
The United States alliance with France during the American Revolution 
necessitated combined operations between French and American naval forces. French 
doctrine, being well-established and battle-proven against the British, was used by these 
combined forces and influenced the future development of doctrine in the U.S. fleet. 
French doctrine was mainly of a defensive nature [Ref. 5:p. 42]. Their doctrine 
emphasized merchant fleet protection and landing force protection rather than decisive 
engagement at sea between combatant fleets [Ref. 5:p. 42]. The French also employed 
the doctrine of a limited fleet engagement designed to occupy an enemy fleet, thus 
preventing the enemy from engaging a weaker force [Ref. 5:p. 37]. The French Navy had 
the most extensive doctrine for the employment of visual signals. Their doctrine in this 
area was the best in the world and was adapted by many navies of the era; it still provides 
the rudimentary basis for visual signals in modern navies.  The influence of the French 
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can be seen in much of U.S. naval doctrine, especially U.S. amphibious doctrine in the 
Pacific theater of World War n. 
The influence of the Spanish Navy on doctrine in the U.S. Navy is much more 
subtle. The Spanish must be given credit for the origins of naval doctrine in many 
countries, especially formal written doctrine. It was the King of Castile that issued the 
world's first written naval doctrine in 1270 [Ref. 5:p. 77]. As mentioned earlier, it was 
Spanish written doctrine that was used as the basis for Britain's first written doctrine. 
Besides originating written doctrine, the Spanish Navy's main influence on U.S. naval 
doctrine was in the lessons learned from its failures. One of the lessons that was taken to 
heart in America was the minimal effect that a weakened Spanish Navy had during the 
Spanish-American wars of independence (1810-1824) [Ref. 5:p. 85]. Spain had 
attempted to pacify its American colonies with its naval forces, but the forces weren't 
even able to protect themselves from privateers [Ref. 5:p. 85]. The lesson that unfolded 
in the U.S. Navy's backyard was that a strong maritime force is essential in the 
maintenance of an overseas presence. This lesson was to play a major role in shaping 
U.S. Naval doctrine in the late 19th century. 
C.        IMPACT OF DOCTRINE ON U.S. NAVAL HISTORY 
As discussed in the definition of doctrine and the discussion of its traits, naval 
doctrine is constantly changing. U.S. naval doctrine has not been immune to these 
changes. Major doctrinal shifts have been observed during times of war or times of major 
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technological change or times of geopolitical change. It is important to understand the 
causes of the doctrinal shifts that have occurred over the Navy's history. Identifying the 
cause and effect relationship between certain occurrences and naval doctrine, illustrated 
by historical examples, can provide a basis for predicting the need for new or revised 
doctrine in the face of current events. The following sections explore major doctrinal 
shifts in the U.S. Navy, the reasons for these changes, and the impact the doctrinal shifts 
had on the Navy. 
1.        American Revolution to the War of 1812 
The groundwork for U.S. naval doctrine was laid during the American Revolution 
and the following 40 years. The traditions and doctrine established during these times 
continue to affect doctrine today. The legacies of John Paul Jones, Stephen Decatur, and 
Oliver Hazard Perry emerged during this era, creating lasting influences on the way U.S. 
naval officers fight at sea. 
Initially, the American government had no desire to create a permanent naval 
force, just a force capable of harassing the British fleet and meeting the basic needs of the 
war effort. The American Navy during the Revolution was not one naval force, but 
several forces that sometimes operated together, but most often independently. The 
Continental Congress commissioned the Continental Navy, and eleven of the thirteen 
colonies created their own naval forces [Ref. 6:p. 3]. These forces played an important 
role in the American war effort, undertaking such missions as local defense, support of 
land operations and commerce raiding [Ref. 6:p. 3].    Each of these missions was 
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undertaken out of necessity.   The reasons for these missions and the conduct of these 
missions led to the development of early American naval doctrines. 
The first doctrine of American naval forces dealt with the protection of 
commercial vessels and maritime trade. In June 1775, two vessels, chartered and 
operated as a part of the Rhode Island Army, conducted clearing operations in 
Narragansett Bay with the intention of weakening the British stranglehold in the area 
[Ref. 6:p. 4]. This is the first American example of organized naval operations with a 
clear purpose. The British problem in Rhode Island prompted the state's delegates to 
propose to the Continental Congress the formation of an "American fleet [Ref. 6:p. 6]." 
As a result of this proposal, the Continental Navy was created on Octoberl3, 1775, when 
two ships were outfitted and armed with orders to intercept British shipping in the Saint 
Lawrence River [Ref. 6:p. 6]. Two weeks later, Congress outfitted additional ships to "be 
employed in such manner, for the protection of defense of the United Colonies [Ref. 6:p. 
6]." An American "fleet" of eight ships, under the command of Esek Hopkins, was 
sortied in January 1776, with orders to clear Chesapeake Bay of enemy raiders that had 
been wreaking havoc on commerce in the area [Ref. 6:p. 7]. Once the Chesapeake was 
cleared, the fleet was to sail north and perform similar operations in the Narragansett 
region [Ref. 6:p. 7]. This first "fleet" action represented the emphasis on the doctrine of 
commerce protection that would become a mainstay of U.S. naval doctrine. 
Naval support of land operations was another doctrine developed during the 
Revolution. It was actually General George Washington who created the first "national" 
naval force on October 2, 1775, almost two weeks prior to the establishment of the 
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Continental Navy [Ref. 6:p. 4]. Washington's forces held dangerously low supplies of 
gunpowder, and his pleas to Congress for re-supply went unanswered [Ref. 6:p. 4]. He 
realized that the quickest way, and probably the only way, for him to get the supplies he 
needed was to steal them from British supply ships [Ref. 6:p. 4]. He chartered a 78-ton 
schooner and gave orders to avoid contact with armed British vessels and to prey only on 
transport and supply ships [Ref. 6:p. 4]. The sole purpose of this operation was to 
indirectly support the needs of the forces ashore, and it set the precedent for naval 
doctrine along these lines. American Doctrine for direct support of ground forces through 
naval action would not be developed (actually adopted) until the French Navy entered the 
war. As previously mentioned, the French Navy had sound doctrine for defending and 
supporting land forces with naval action and employed this doctrine at Yorktown in 1781 
[Ref. 5:p. 39]. American naval officers could not help but be influenced by the success of 
the doctrine employed by the French. 
Commerce raiding also became a key doctrine of the early American Navy. The 
operations of Washington's schooner squadron discussed in the previous paragraph 
provide the origins not only for land support doctrine, but for commerce raiding as well. 
The commerce raiding operations that were most influential for American naval doctrine 
actually took place overseas. In January 1777, the first foreign operations of American 
naval forces occurred in the English Channel [Ref. 6:p. 16]. Lambert Wickes 
commanded the Reprisal, which captured five British prizes after delivering Benjamin 
Franklin to France for diplomatic purposes [Ref. 6:p. 16]. These successes led to the 
establishment of an American squadron of three ships, based in France, which conducted 
24 
operations as far north as the Irish Sea [Ref. 6:p. 16]. These ships captured 18 British 
prizes, and so enraged the British that a diplomatic storm developed between the British 
and French, resulting in the expulsion of the ships from their French bases [Ref. 6:p. 16]. 
The success of these operations cannot be measured in only the number of prizes taken. 
The British were forced to protect shipping at home, thus limiting the resources available 
to press further operations in America. The political storm that arose exacerbated 
relations between France and Britain. This situation forced the British to keep resources 
close to home to defend against the French threat, and possibly hastened France's entry 
into the war in support of the American colonies. The final benefit, and the one most 
closely related to doctrine, is that, for the first time, Americans realized that they could 
operate overseas with success. 
Many American squadrons conducted commerce raiding operations in European 
waters throughout the remainder of the war. It was during these operations that one of the 
most influential battles, with respect to U.S. naval doctrine, occurred. The September 23, 
1779 duel between HMS Serapis and John Paul Jones' Bonhomme Richard had 
resounding doctrinal effects in the U.S. Navy [Ref. 7:p. 10]. The battle itself holds little 
significance in the area of tactical doctrine. The importance of this battle lies in the 
fighting principles demonstrated by Jones in his famous quote: "I have not yet begun to 
fight!" The tenacity and courage displayed by Jones became cornerstones of the U.S. 
naval officer's fighting doctrine that remain to this day. 
Following the American Revolution, the naval policy of the new nation was 
uncertain.  Many politicians opposed maintaining a permanent navy in view of its cost 
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and the perceived lack of a threat from overseas enemies.   The detractors of the Navy 
purported that a navy is a tool of an imperialist state, and that just having a navy was sure 
to involve the U.S. in overseas conflict. On June 3, 1785, the Navy's opponents 
triumphed and the Continental Navy's last frigate, Alliance, was sold [Ref. 7:p. 15]. For 
the next nine years, the United States was without a navy [Ref. 7:p. 15].   While the 
American colonies were still under British control, they received the protection of the 
Royal Navy for their overseas trade.   Once independence was won, American shipping 
was left to fend for itself. As early as 1783, the Barbary Coast nations of North Africa 
began to seize American ships in the Mediterranean, demanding tribute for safe passage 
[Ref. 7:p. 16]. In January 1791, the Senate Committee on Mediterranean Trade issued a 
report stating that only a strong naval force could protect the nation's overseas commerce 
[Ref. 7:p. 15].   In 1793, President George Washington indicated his support for the 
establishment of a navy with a recommendation for the construction of six frigates to 
protect American ships from the Algerines [Ref. 7:p. 16]. Mainly as a result of the threat 
to overseas commerce, the United States Navy was established on March 27, 1794, with 
congressional authorization for the construction of six frigates [Ref. 7:p. 16].   With its 
inception so closely tied to commerce protection, it is not surprising that one of the most 
enduring doctrines of the U.S. Navy is the protection of sea lines of communication. 
The years between the establishment of the U.S. Navy and the declaration of war 
on Great Britain in 1812 saw the development of doctrine for combatant battles at sea and 
convoy operations. The Quasi-War with France (1798-1801) provided the first 
opportunity for combatant vs. combatant action for the infant U.S. Navy.   3h February 
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1799, the frigate Constellation won the U.S. Navy's first victory over a combatant in an 
engagement with the French frigate, L'Insurgente [Ref. 7:p. 18]. This engagement is 
important because it reinforced for the U.S. Navy the standard naval doctrine regarding 
the use of naval artillery. The battle was decided through the skillful use of raking fire. 
Though it carried a larger crew and could have still repelled boarders, L 'Insurgente struck 
its colors following two rounds of devastating raking fire from the American ship [Ref. 
7:p. 17]. In addition to combat doctrine, the Quasi-War, saw the first use of convoy 
doctrine by the U.S. Navy. The first convoy escorted by the U.S. Navy sailed in July of 
1800 [Ref. 7:p. 18] The Quasi-War with France ended in February 1801, with only one 
American ship lost compared to the 85 French ships (including two frigates) captured by 
the U.S. Navy [Ref. 7:p. 19]. This respectable showing against a major continental 
European power, emboldened the Navy and its doctrine. 
Other doctrinal developments during this period occurred during the War with 
Tripoli (1801-1805). Operations during this conflict provided the basis for special 
operations doctrine, and amphibious warfare combined with shore bombardment 
doctrine. The exploits of Lieutenant Stephen Decatur during his operation to destroy the 
captured frigate Philadelphia, at anchor in Tripoli harbor beneath the protective guns of 
the Pasha's castle, had an effect on fighting principles similar to that of John Paul Jones 
[Ref. 6:p. 40]. Decatur's plan to sneak into the harbor, set the Philadelphia afire, and 
fight his way back out was successful, and became a model of ingenuity and bravery for 
U.S. naval officers to emulate. Another significant operation occurred when General 
William Eaton led a force of 400 Arabs and seven U.S. Marines on a cross-desert march 
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from Alexandria, Egypt to the Tripolitan town of Dema [Ref. 7:p. 24]. Under supporting 
fire from the brig Argus and the schooner Nautilus, the small force captured the town 
and forced the Pasha to the negotiating table [Ref. 7:p. 24]. This combination of ground 
forces supported by naval fires provided an example that was to influence future 
amphibious doctrine. 
The War of 1812 raised several doctrinal debates in the U.S. Navy.   At the 
commencement of hostilities, the U.S. Navy consisted of 17 seaworthy vessels while the 
Royal Navy had over 1000 combatant ships [Ref. 7:p. 28]. Such a disparity between the 
forces required the senior Captains of the U.S. navy to debate the method for the 
employment of its scarce resources.   John Rodgers, the senior commander, advocated 
forming all of the ships into a single squadron and sailing to the British Isles to engage 
the British ships while they were on station operating singly or by twos or threes and 
eliminate them one by one [Ref. 6:p. 47].  Stephen Decatur, now a Captain, voiced the 
opposition to this plan, stating that the U.S. fleet should be dispersed to operate singly or 
in pairs to conduct commerce raiding operations [Ref. 6:p. 47]. To support his argument, 
Decatur recalled the recent successes of commerce raiding by the French and also made 
the point that if a single ship or pair of ships was engaged by a British Fleet, the loss 
would be much less than if the entire American fleet were engaged and wiped out in a 
single battle [Ref. 6:p. 47].   There were, of course, some personal reasons behind the 
differing arguments of the senior leadership, but both arguments had their merits, and the 
Navy's leadership found itself in a doctrinal conundrum.   The decision made was a 
compromise: creating two squadrons, one under Rodgers' command, the other belonging 
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to Decatur [Ref. 6:p. 47]. Continuing fear of the British fleet's numerical superiority led 
to the consolidation of the two squadrons shortly before the declaration of war in June 
1812 [Ref. 6:p. 47]. Rodgers' fleet captured only seven small prizes in the ensuing 
months, while the frigates Constitution and Essex, cruising singly after failing to 
rendezvous with Rodgers' squadron, each captured a British man-of-war [Ref. 6:p. 48]. It 
seems that historical evidence supports Decatur's doctrine over Rodgers'. 
A discussion of naval doctrine and the War of 1812 is not complete without a 
review of the exploits of another U.S. naval hero, Oliver Hazard Perry. Perry 
commanded the Lake Erie squadron, which consisted of nine ships mounting 54 guns 
[Ref. 7:p. 32]. He met and engaged a British squadron of six ships mounting 64 guns, 
commanded by Commodore Robert H. Barclay, a veteran of Trafalgar [Ref. 7:p. 32]. 
Perry closed and engaged the British line with his flagship, which was inexplicably 
unsupported by the other ships of his squadron and subsequently disabled. Perry then left 
his disabled ship, rowed to the brig Niagara, and reengaged the British, breaking their 
line and capturing all of their vessels [Ref. 7:p. 32]. This stunning victory gained full 
control of Lake Erie and allowed future offensive operations to recover Detroit from the 
British [Ref. 7:p. 32]. The example provided by Oliver Hazard Perry further strengthened 
the ideals and principles with which the Navy attempted to indoctrinate all of its officers. 
2.        Civil War 
Between the years of 1815 and 1861, the United States was not forced into any 
major confrontations at sea.   The lack of action led to a stagnation of naval doctrine. 
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Even the introduction of steam propulsion did not spur any significant doctrinal 
development. As a matter of fact, the introduction of a more reliable means of propulsion 
led to a re-application of the pre-artillery tactics of ramming! There were, of course, 
certain events during these years that demonstrated the application of existing naval 
doctrine. The Barbary Wars presented the origins of the doctrine of "gunboat diplomacy" 
which the U.S. Navy applied around the world. Naval officers established contact and 
diplomatic relations with several foreign countries, beginning with Captain David 
Geiseinger's 1833 treaty with Siam and culminating with the opening of Tokyo Bay by 
Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1854 [Ref. 7:p. 60]. The Mexican War saw liberal 
application of amphibious warfare doctrine and the employment of the U.S. Marines, 
most famously at the storming of Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City [Ref. 7:p. 56]. For 
the most part, doctrine continued as established, with little innovation or re-evaluation 
until the beginning of the Civil War in April 1861. 
The first action of the American Civil war was the Confederate naval 
bombardment of Fort Sumter, but both sides knew that it would not be a naval action that 
decided the war. Naval strategists on both sides knew that there would not be a decisive, 
Trafalgar-like fleet engagement on the open ocean. Neither the United States nor the 
Confederacy had a fleet capable of such action. The South lacked the resources to build 
such a fleet, and the North had no need to build one as the Confederacy did not have one 
or pose the threat to build one [Ref. 8:p. 161]. From this knowledge, both sides 
deliberated which doctrines should to apply to their respective fleets. Not surprisingly, 
the doctrines selected matched the 18th and 19th century historical pattern of conflict: the 
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side with the stronger naval force adopted a blockading doctrine with the intent of 
strangling its opponent's economic resource base and mounting periodic amphibious 
assaults, while the weaker side adopted commerce raiding tactics and coastal defense 
measures [Ref. 8:p. 162]. 
One of the unique doctrinal aspects of the Civil War was that, for the first time, 
American naval officers could develop and employ doctrine from a position of relative 
naval strength. The U.S. naval command decided on the employment of a traditional 
blockading doctrine. The blockade of Confederate ports taxed the U.S. Navy to its limits 
and represented an important change in its doctrine. The United States had argued 
internationally that for a blockade had to be enforceable in order to be legal. The South 
had nearly 3000 miles of coastline that, according to doctrine, had to be closed. In 1861, 
the U.S. Navy numbered approximately 42 active duty vessels, many of which were on 
foreign station [Ref. 8:p. 162]. There was no possible way for the North to enforce what 
it had defined as a "legal" blockade. In the end, pragmatism won out and the principles 
behind the doctrine of blockade changed to accept the application of a "best effort" 
blockade. 
The doctrine adopted by the Confederate Navy had considerable effect on the 
establishment of new doctrine in the U.S. Navy. In an attempt to develop doctrine and 
tactics that would break the Union blockade, the Confederates developed three types of 
ships: rams, raiders, and runners [Ref. 8:p. 164]. The "rams" were ironclad rams with 
rifled guns located in turrets. They were built with the intent of providing coastal defense 
and breaking the blockade through direct engagement. The "raiders" were wooden ships 
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powered by a combination of sail and steam. These vessels were to pursue the traditional 
guerre de course by preying on Union commercial shipping. The "runners" were fast, 
shallow draft vessels designed to carry cargos from Southern ports to points of transfer in 
the Caribbean. Other than being designed to counter the blockade, these three ship types 
had another thing in common: steam propulsion. The extensive use of steam propulsion 
by the South forced its proliferation in the U.S. Navy. This presented a problem that was 
first experienced by the Navy during the Mexican war. The refueling of steam ships was 
difficult at sea and was best accomplished at shore stations. In addition to this 
requirement, the steam ships were much more reliant on shore stations for maintenance 
and upkeep. These factors made it imperative for the U.S. to seize bases for naval 
operations on Confederate shores. This represents the genesis of the doctrine of forward 
bases of operations. 
Another major doctrinal event that would affect navies throughout the world was 
the obsolescence of the wooden hull brought about by improvements in gunnery and the 
introduction of the ironclad. The epic duel between the Monitor and the C.S.S. Virginia 
off of Hampton Roads in March 1862 marked the beginning of a new era in naval 
warfare. Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory had espoused a vision of a 
single "supership" that could rip through an entire wooden blockade fleet on its way to 
shelling a coastal town (e.g. New York) into submission [Ref. 8:p. 166]. The Virginia 
easily dispatched two wooden blockaders and was well on the way to realizing this vision 
at Hampton Roads before the Monitor arrived and instigated the aforementioned 
engagement. Although it failed in fulfilling the vision for its employment, the Virginia's 
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exploits and the threat of a single vessel having such an impact shaped doctrinal 
development for the U.S. Navy well into the next century. 
Like other American conflicts, the Civil War witnessed the emergence of another 
naval personality that would have an effect on doctrine. In August 1864, Rear Admiral 
David Glasgow Farragut led a Union squadron of four monitor ships and 14 wooden- 
hulled screw sloops against the defenses of Mobile Bay, Alabama [Ref 7:p. 85]. To enter 
the bay, the squadron first had to pass through a narrow channel that was heavily mined 
on the west side. The lead ship in the squadron, the monitor Tecumseh, made a westerly 
turn towards the CSS Tennessee that took it dangerously close to the minefield. The 
Tecumseh struck a mine and sunk in minutes, taking 90 of 114 hands on board [Ref. 7:p. 
85]. Upon witnessing this tragedy, the lead element of wooden-hulled ships, the 
Brooklyn, began to backwater, threatening to throw the entire column into disarray. It 
was at this moment that Farragut bellowed to his Flag Captain on the Hartford, "Damn 
the torpedoes! Full speed ahead...! [Ref. 7:p. 86]." The Hartford surged past the 
Brooklyn, leading the squadron into Mobile Bay where it soundly defeated the 
Confederate ships on station. Farragut's intuition told him that most of the mines were 
old and most likely inoperable. He also knew that maintaining the ships of his squadron 
in a column formation was the safest way to traverse the minefield. His intuition, 
courage, and clear thinking under pressure defined the way that U.S. naval officers should 
react in battle for future generations. 
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3.        Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Spanish-American War 
For the next quarter of a century, there would be little doctrinal change in the U.S. 
Navy. Throughout its history, the Navy had found its identity in the protection of 
commercial shipping and providing coastal defense for the American continent. The 
relative peace of this era (1865-1890) did not provide much validation for this view of the 
Navy. Commercial shipping was done mostly aboard foreign flagged vessels (much the 
same as today), and there was little fear in the general population of interference or attack 
from overseas naval forces. America did not see itself as a great maritime nation with 
vital interests abroad that needed protection. Most Americans were thankful for the 
"blessing" of oceans to the east and west and weaker states to the north and south. For 
the most part, the United States was happy in its relative isolation, but its Navy, 
struggling for an identity and a purpose, was not. 
The rumblings of the coming naval renaissance had been shaking the foundations 
of naval doctrine around the world for years. The advent of steam propulsion and its 
pursuant requirements for forward coaling and maintenance stations slowly increased the 
need for offensive elements capable of long-range deployments. The rising popularity 
and prominence of ironclad ships and the increase in their abilities created new concerns 
as well. The balance of power among European states, which had contributed greatly to 
an enduring 19l century peace, had given way to imperial competition, mainly between 
Germany and Britain. This competition led to a wild grab for coaling stations and 
forward bases around the world. The Caribbean was vulnerable to European penetration. 
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From Caribbean stations, European powers could exert their influence and dominate trade 
through the prospective canal in Panama [Ref. 9:p. 10]. Weakly defended California and 
the rest of the American west coast then would be vulnerable to these European powers as 
well as threats from South American navies. American interests in the Samoan islands 
were threatened by German and Britain involvement in the region [Ref. 7:p. 98]. All of 
these factors combined to present a situation that was untenable with current naval forces. 
The transformation of the U.S. navy and its doctrine began with the publication of 
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's treatise on naval strategy, The Influence of Sea Power 
Upon History, 1660-1783, in 1890. Mahan based most of his analysis and conclusions on 
a study of the lengthy maritime struggle between Great Britain and France. Mahan's 
overriding conclusion was that victory at sea resulted only when a navy concentrated its 
operations on engaging and vanquishing an opposing fleet, thus winning "command of 
the sea" [Ref. 7:p. 99]. He also claimed that America should view itself as a maritime 
state in a world full of strong opposing navies. The U.S. Navy of the time consisted of 
detached cruiser squadrons operating throughout the world and monitors for coastal 
harbor defense at home [Ref. 9:p. 2]. In Mahan's view, this kind of navy was inadequate. 
Enemy ships approaching in fleet strength could not be stopped by commerce raiders, and 
blockades could not be broken by harbor defenses. Americans had to realize that they 
faced a national security crisis that had to be met offshore. He promoted a new 
overarching doctrine for the Navy, "offensive sea control." Part of this doctrine called for 
the restructuring of the existing naval force into a battle fleet. Sea control could only be 
established by a concentrated battle fleet that was ready to meet an enemy battle fleet in a 
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decisive engagement at sea. American experience in the Revolution, the War of 1812 and 
the Civil War had demonstrated that such a fleet could not be improvised or created after 
the commencement of hostilities. Such a fleet had to be in existence during times of 
peace as well as war. Mahan stated that command of the sea, won by the battle fleet, was 
paramount and a precondition to the successful completion of secondary missions such as 
the establishment or breaking of a blockade, or the protection or destruction of shipping. 
Mahan sounded the call for the creation of a United States Navy consisting of offensive 
battleship fleets employing the doctrine of offensive sea control. 
Mahan based one of his main principles on the principles of land warfare 
espoused by the Swiss General A.H. Jomini. The most prominent of Jomini's principles 
adapted by Mahan, itself borrowed from the earlier writings of Carl Von Clausewitz, was 
the concept of "centers of gravity" in battle. This concept states that massed offensive 
force should be applied against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point [Ref. 9:p. 
14]. Mahan's adaptation of this concept emphasized "fleet concentration" as a guiding 
doctrine. American naval officers took this proclamation to heart and added the 
corollary, "never divide the fleet [Ref. 9:p. 14]." Using Mahan's sea control principles 
and his emphasis on the offensive, the U.S. Navy established the doctrine of seeking out a 
decisive fleet engagement. The Navy also instituted the doctrine of taking the fight to the 
enemy rather that waiting for the enemy to appear off of its home shores. In keeping with 
this theme, the Navy became a proponent of forward-deployed elements capable of 
supporting this doctrine. Mahan's influence on the Navy and its doctrine was profound. 
Naval officers that had struggled with finding an identity and purpose for existence 
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latched onto Mahan's theories with unfailing devotion. Mahan lifted the Navy to a 
position of preeminence in national strategy, and provided a new sense of purpose and 
dignity for its officer corps. 
Mahan's influence extended beyond the reaches of the naval service into 
Congress. In 1890, the United States had the twelfth largest navy in the world [Ref. 9:p. 
11]. Clearly, the goal of offensive sea control was not achievable from this position. Sea 
Power created a groundswell of public opinion in support of its principles and generated 
interest at many levels of government. Just over a month after the publication of Mahan's 
work, Congress authorized the construction of three new battleships [Ref. 7:p. 99]. This 
begins the buildup of American naval power that will see the United States Navy move to 
a position of third in the world by the time of Mahan's death in December 1914 [Ref. 9:p. 
11]. 
The first opportunity for the application of Mahanian principles in an operational 
scenario came with the Spanish-American War in 1898. Upon the commencement of 
hostilities with Spain in April 1898, the U.S. Navy wasted little time in employing its new 
doctrine. The first application of Mahanian doctrine was the order for Commodore 
George Dewey's Asiatic Squadron to sortie from Hong Kong and engage the Spanish 
fleet in the Philippines [Ref. 7:p. 103]. This operation was in keeping with the doctrine 
of using forward-deployed battle fleet to aggressively seek out a decisive engagement 
with the opposing fleet. Though successful, the Battle of Manila Bay was not the 
prototypical fleet engagement envisioned by Mahan. Instead of engaging the opposing 
fleet in the open ocean, Dewey entered Manila Bay under cover of night and, upon 
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daybreak, shelled the anchored Spanish fleet. However, thts egagement was hailed as a 
triumph of the new doctrines and did much to further their acceptance.   The Battle of 
Santiago, fought off of Cuba in August 1898, was important for the validation of the new 
doctrine because it represented the first time that the new battleships saw significant 
action.    A concentrated American fleet under the overall command of Acting Rear 
Admiral William T. Sampson had bottled up Spain's main battle fleet in the harbor at 
Santiago.   The Spanish commander, Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, under 
orders from the governor general of Cuba, attempted a desperate escape from the harbor, 
and the American battleships destroyed the entire Spanish fleet.  Once again, Mahanian 
doctrine, reinforced by the decisive fleet action at sea, was applauded and gained 
momentum. This momentum carried the U.S. Navy into the 20th century and sustained it 
through the years leading to World War I. 
4.        World War I and the Inter-War Years 
As mentioned earlier, the United States possessed the third largest navy in the 
world at the commencement of World War I. This is a testament to the strength of 
Mahan's influence. The early years of the 20th century saw an increase in the United 
States' overseas holdings and foreign economic interests. This was an ambitious time for 
the United States, but relatively peaceful. The lack of direct threats to the U.S. mainland 
and the brewing troubles in Europe brought renewed calls for isolationist policies. There 
were repeated calls to halt further construction of battleships and to reign in the 
"imperialist" tendencies of the Navy. These isolationist movements failed to gain traction 
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in a world where several countries were undertaking significant programs to increase their 
naval strength, namely Germany and Japan. 
In 1908, the U.S. Navy proclaimed its Mahanian rebirth to the world in an 
impressive display of sea power. The round-the-world cruise of the "Great White Fleet", 
consisting of 16 battleships with their supporting colliers and auxiliaries, demonstrated 
the American ability to place a formidable battle fleet anywhere in the world. The cruise 
was unprecedented and many naval detractors said that it was technologically infeasible. 
The naysayers were proven wrong and the cruise was a total success. The cruise was 
doctrinally important because it proved that the Navy had the means with which to carry 
out its espoused doctrine. The proven abilities of the battle fleet and the growing threats 
in both the Pacific and the Atlantic led to the commissioning of the first American 
dreadnoughts in 1910 [Ref. 7:p. 123]. These were the first true dreadnoughts built on a 
par with those of Great Britain and Germany. These battleships and others like them 
would secure the United States position as the third most powerful navy in the world in 
1914. 
At the outbreak of World War I in Europe, President Woodrow Wilson issued a 
series of neutrality proclamations and begged all Americans to be impartial "in thought as 
well as in action [Ref. 8:p. 247]." Wilson walked a fine line between proclaiming U.S. 
neutrality and preparing for its defense. Naval strategists were clamoring for the 
concentration of battle fleets to patrol the waters offshore of the American east coast [Ref. 
8:p. 247]. Such battle fleets were created and placed on station, but a new threat posed 
serious problems for "command of the sea."    Great Britain had imposed a virtual 
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blockade of the European continent and had bottled-up the German High Seas Fleet in the 
North Sea. To counter this, Germany declared a war zone around Great Britain, in which 
it would sink enemy merchant ships without warning.   The weapon they would use to 
enforce this war zone was the U-boat.  In May 1915, a German U-boat sank the British 
passenger liner Lusitania, killing almost 1200 people, including 128 Americans [Ref. 8:p. 
249]. Americans were enraged by these new rules of warfare. American naval officers 
were deeply concerned, as this new submarine warfare doctrine threatened any navy's 
ability to maintain sea control. The Lusitania incident marked the beginning of the U.S. 
Navy's serious preparation for war.  One of the most prominent voices in this time was 
that of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He made a public 
statement that: 
Our national defense must extend all over the western hemisphere, must 
go out a thousand miles into the sea.. .We must create a Navy not only to 
protect our shores and our possessions, but our merchant ships in time of 
war, no matter where they may go [Ref. 8:p. 249]. 
This rhetoric resulted in a $285 million package centered on the construction of four new 
battleships and four battle cruisers [Ref. 8:p. 249]. The Battle of Jutland in May/June 
1916 seemed to reinforce the doctrine of battle fleets seeking out decisive engagements 
and encouraged U.S. building plans in an upward direction. The end result of this was 
that the U.S. Navy, like many other navies, became increasingly invested in battleships. 
This overwhelming support of the battleship as the ultimate naval weapon seemed 
to ignore what was actually happening at sea. The much praised and emulated British 
battle fleet was unable to gain any semblance of sea control around its own home islands. 
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In February 1917, Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare within the war zone 
declared around Great Britain, and in so doing, drew the United States into World War I 
[Ref. 7:p. 135]. Guerre de course, so maligned by Mahan, was proving to be Germany's 
saving grace. With the resumption of unrestricted warfare, Germany hoped to starve 
Britian into submission before the U.S. could mobilize its forces and effect the outcome 
of the war. Great Britain's naval strategists could not conceive of pulling destroyers from 
the blockade of the German High Seas fleet to conduct escort operations for its 
increasingly vulnerable commercial ships. An American naval officer assigned as the 
direct link between the U.S. Naval command and the Bitish Admiralty would refocus 
attention on this most pressing threat. 
Rear Admiral William S. Sims promoted the idea that a convoy sytem was the key 
to defeating the U-boat threat. When ignored by the Admiralty, Sims took his plan 
directly to the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. Lloyd George bought the 
convoy plan and intervened directly with the Admiralty. The beneficial results of the 
convoy system were immediate. Shipping losses began to decrease, while the number of 
U-boat sinkings increased. For a time, ship-building efforts in the U.S. shifted 
completely away from the construction of capital ships and concentrated wholly on 
building destroyer-type escort vessels [Ref. 9:p. 255]. Breaking the U-boat threat proved 
to be the key to the war, allowing unmolested transport of American personnel and 
materiel across the Atlantic. It is important to note the difficulty experienced by Sims in 
selling his plan to both the British Admiralty and the U.S. naval command. Both navies 
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were so focused on their Mahanian doctrine that they were unable to see beyond its 
paradigms. For Great Britain, this inability nearly proved fatal. 
As soon as World War I was over, its lessons seemed to be forgotten. Despite the 
near defeat of Great Britain at the hands of submarines, the battleship remained "king of 
the seas" in the eyes of the world's navies. Naval arms treaties between the U.S., Great 
Britain, and Japan focused only on the numbers of capital ships (battleships and the new 
aircraft carriers).   Submarines were completely ignored in these negotiations.  Another 
branch of naval warfare that was somewhat overlooked was naval aviation, which was in 
its infancy during these years.   The first shipboard takeoff and landing of an aircraft 
occurred within a year of each other in 1910 and 1911 respectively [Ref. 7:p. 124].  In 
1921, General Billy Mitchell conducted an experimental air attack in which he bombed 
and sank a former German battleship, subsequently claiming that the sinking signaled the 
end of the surface warship [Ref. 7:p.  145].    These experiments in naval aviation 
culminated in the commissioning of the U.S. Navy's first aircraft carrier, the Langley, in 
March 1922.  Though recognized as having important applications in naval warfare, the 
full extent of aviation's effect on doctrine would not be realized until the first months of 
American involvement in World War H    In 1941, the U.S. Navy was intent on 
maintaining the doctrine that had fueled its growth for 50 years: offensive sea control 
affected by battleship fleets. 
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5.        World War II 
World War II changed the face of naval warfare forever. New technology, tactics, 
and ideology forced sweeping changes in naval doctrine throughout the world. In some 
cases, these changes merely modified existing doctrine, but in others, the changes 
required the synthesis of completely new doctrine. The Pacific theater of World War II 
would serve as the stage for nearly all of the major doctrinal changes that occurred. 
Following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Japan emerged as a premiere 
naval power in the Pacific and the United States chief Mahanian rival in the region. War 
Plan Orange was formalized in 1911 as a scheme for meeting the threat of Japanese 
aggression in the Pacific [Ref. 9:p. 270]. One of the basic tenets of Plan Orange was that 
the U.S. would maintain a 5:3 ratio with Japan in the Pacific in all classes of fighting 
ships and personnel [Ref. 9:p. 270]. By the end of 1922, the bulk of the U.S. battle fleet 
was stationed in the Pacific. In keeping with the Mahanian doctrine, the heart of this fleet 
was the battleship. Aircraft carriers were components of this fleet, but their role was to 
provide air defense for the battleships. In May 1940, the entire U.S. Pacific battle fleet 
was permanently stationed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii [Ref. 9:p. 291]. Instead of having a 
deterrent effect on Japanese aggression, this fleet became a target ofthat aggression. The 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which resulted in the destruction or disabling of the 
eight American battleships in port [Ref. 9:p. 306], forced the Navy to depart from its 
deeply held battleship doctrine. 
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The following six months, December 1941-May 1942, witnessed some of the 
most dynamic doctrine development in the history of the United States Navy. There were 
three main naval doctrines that emerged from this flurry of activity. The most immediate 
shift was a return to the traditional American doctrine of guerre de course, but with 
submarines as its instruments. The second development was the establishment of the 
aircraft carrier as a means of power projection through aircraft raids. The third new 
doctrine was the designation of the aircraft carrier as the main capital ship of the battle 
fleet. 
The Navy felt a deep-seated need to avenge the men and ships that it had lost at 
Pearl Harbor. The most quickly deployable and only available means for this purpose 
were the submarines stationed at Pearl Harbor, which had been overlooked by the 
Japanese attackers in their zeal to destroy the battlewagons. The Navy took the 
previously unthinkable step of declaring unrestricted submarine warfare on Japan. This 
action is a perfect example of how grave circumstances can cause shifts in morals and 
principles among officers, leading to the employment of a doctrine that was once 
abhorrent to those same officers. 
The second doctrinal development, which represented another extension of the 
U.S. Navy's desire for quick revenge, was exemplified by the Halsey-Doolittle raid on 
Tokyo. The ability to project power ashore through air raids launched from aircraft 
carriers was a significant factor throughout the war. The material effect of the Tokyo raid 
was minimal, but the strategic effects were far reaching, because it caused Japan to 
designate significant military resources for defense of the home islands. This prevented 
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those resources from being used in other theaters of operations. The doctrine of carrier- 
launched air raids would become a major tool for U.S. naval commanders. 
The last of these new doctrines employed by the U.S. Navy was the doctrine 
placing the aircraft carrier at the center of the battle fleet. The incapacitation of the entire 
Pacific battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor forced the Navy to develop this doctrine. In 
removing the battleship from the equation, the striking power of carrier aircraft was 
released from its role of air defense for the fleet. This allowed the aircraft to be employed 
offensively against an enemy fleet. This doctrine was regarded with skepticism by the 
Navy's "gun club" of battleship Admirals, but it proved itself as viable and necessary at 
the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 7-8 1942). At Coral Sea, the entire engagement was 
fought with carrier-based aircraft engaging surface combatants. The surface elements of 
the two forces never even sighted each other; much less get close enough to engage with 
surface fire. This doctrine was reinforced less than a month later by the American victory 
at the Battle of Midway. 
The success of submarine doctrine and carrier doctrines did not sound the death 
knell for Mahanian doctrine in the U.S. Navy. The basic tenets of offensive sea control 
remained the same. A main objective of both the U.S Navy and the Imperial Japanese 
Navy (UN) was to draw its opponent into a major fleet engagement on the open ocean. 
The UN's attempt at this resulted in the previously mentioned Battle of Midway. As the 
war progressed and the U.S. regained parity and superiority in the Pacific, it too searched 
for that decisive fleet engagement. 
45 
It was the search for the decisive, open-ocean fleet engagement that nearly led to a 
major disaster for the U.S. Navy. By late 1943, the U.S. had gained enough momentum 
in the Pacific to proceed with a modified version of War Plan Orange and launched its 
island-hopping campaign through the Central Pacific with the invasion of Tarawa.  For 
the next several months, the U.S. Navy refined its amphibious doctrine to a near art form. 
The refinements of amphibious doctrine included the addition of air elements for support 
and defense of the landing fleet as well as procedures for "softening up" the beachhead. 
In June 1944, the Navy began its campaign in the Marianas Islands. It was during this 
campaign that a major conflict between existing doctrines emerged.   Vice Admiral 
Raymond A. Spruance's Fifth Fleet had taken station to the Southwest of the Marianas to 
provide a protective screen for the amphibious landing force against the Japanese 
"Mobile Fleet". Spruance held his carrier task force close to the landing force, patiently 
providing a defensive screen in accordance with the Navy's refined amphibious doctrine. 
There were indications that the Japanese fleet was nearby, and Spruance's task force 
commander, Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, lobbied that his Task Force 58 should be 
detached in order to seek out the Japanese fleet in a decisive engagement.   Spruance 
declined the request and his patience paid off at dawn on 19 June, when the force's radars 
detected an incoming wave of Japanese aircraft.   The resulting engagement became 
known as the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot," in which the American task force 
destroyed 350 Japanese planes, and in a chasing action destroyed one carrier and two 
oilers, while damaging two other carriers [Ref. 9:p. 324].    There were rumblings, 
however, back at Pacific fleet headquarters that Spruance had missed a chance for the all- 
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important decisive fleet engagement.    Spruance's relief, Admiral William J. "Bull" 
Halsey, was determined not to make the same "mistake." 
Halsey was a Mahanian in the strictest sense of the word. He was determined to 
search out the decisive fleet engagement with the main Japanese battle fleet. At the 
Battle of Leyte Gulf, Halsey was presented with what he perceived to be such an 
opportunity. In late October 1944, General Douglas Mac Arthur, embarked in the U.S. 
Seventh Fleet, conducted an amphibious landing on Leyte Island in the Philippine 
archipelago. Halsey was in command of the Third Fleet, which provided protection to the 
landing force from Japanese advances through the Sibuyan Sea and the northern 
approaches to the Philippines [Ref. 10:p. 63]. Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet was 
made up of the landing force and a task force defending the southern approaches through 
the Surigao Strait [Ref. 10:p. 63]. Halsey's direct orders from Admiral Nimitz, 
CINCPAC, were to "cover and support forces of the Southwest Pacific (Kinkaid's 
Seventh Fleet)," but with the loophole, "in case opportunity for destruction of the enemy 
fleet offers or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task" [Ref. 9:p. 326]. 
Halsey took advantage of this loophole upon detecting a Japanese carrier force to the 
north of the Philippines. Believing he had neutralized an advancing Japanese force in the 
Sibuyan Sea, Halsey took his entire fleet north to pursue an engagement with the 
Japanese carrier fleet. In keeping with Mahanian doctrine, he kept his fleet concentrated 
without detaching any elements to remain and defend the approaches through the Sibuyan 
Sea. Halsey made several miscalculations in his pursuit of the decisive engagement. He 
overestimated the damage his forces had inflicted on the Japanese force in the Sibuyan 
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Sea and underestimated the tenacity of the Japanese commander, who continued his 
advance. Halsey also overestimated the strength of the Japanese carrier force to the north, 
which was in fact a toothless decoy sent with the exact purpose of drawing him away 
from the landing force. All of these miscalculations led to near disaster when the 
Japanese central force of battleships and cruisers advanced through the Sibuyan Sea and 
approached the nearly defenseless landing force. If not for the heroic actions of a few 
brave captains of destroyers and auxiliary carriers, the landing force might have been 
completely destroyed. The doctrinal lesson of this battle is significant. A commander 
must ensure that when conflicting doctrines exist, a clear order of precedence must be 
stated and promulgated to subordinates. In this case, Halsey, Kinkaid, and Nimitz were 
all playing from different sheets of music, and the results were nearly disastrous. 
Unlike the lessons of World War I, the lessons of World War II were taken to 
heart and provided a basis for future doctrinal development. The importance of 
submarine warfare and naval aviation were impossible to ignore and were now closely 
interwoven with the Navy's existing doctrine. It was the development and employment 
of atomic weapons at the end of World War U, though, that would bring about the most 
profound changes in future U.S. Navy doctrine. 
6.        The Nuclear Age 
At the end of 1945, United States Navy was the preeminent naval force in the 
world. With this came the mantle that had been carried for centuries by Britain's Royal 
Navy. Even at this time, its finest hour, the Navy came under fire from critics. A civilian 
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strategist, Bernard Brodie, wrote in 1946 that, "the Navy's indubitably superb 
accomplishment in the greatest of all naval wars will not facilitate its taking the lead in 
revaluing its own place in the national security [Ref. ll:p. 1]." The scope of the Navy's 
victory threatened to make it obsolete in the eyes of many strategists; there just were not 
any naval threats to the United States left in the world. The advent of the atomic bomb 
brought out scores of "Mitchell-ites" claiming that all military forces, save strategic air 
forces, were now obsolete [Ref. 11: p. 1]. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, 
appointed in 1944, would provide the direction and the voice that the Navy would need to 
survive these attacks and reinvent itself. 
Forrestal was described as a cold warrior before the Cold War began. His greatest 
contribution to the Navy was the identification of the Soviet Union as the most likely 
threat to U.S. security. He stressed the need for the maintenance of a strong naval force 
despite the deafening public cries for a large peace dividend. He argued that, "the 
outstanding lesson of the past quarter century is that the means to wage war must be in 
the hands of those who hate war [Ref. 11: p. 11]." Alas, the American public did not 
listen. 
At the close of World War n, the Navy consisted of 3.4 million officers and 
enlisted personnel, 1200 combatant ships, and more than 40,000 aircraft [Ref. 6:p. 292]. 
By June 1950, naval personnel numbered 375,000, major combatants were down to 237, 
and aircraft numbered only about 4300 [Ref. 6:p. 292]. In 1949, hard times were made 
harder when, acting with new authority granted by Congress, the Secretary of Defense 
cancelled the construction of the first post-war aircraft carrier, the United States [Ref. 6:p. 
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293]. It seemed to the Navy that efforts were underway to divest it of its air arm. Top 
naval officers registered vocal complaints regarding the cancellation of this ship and 
expressed their displeasure with the Air Force's expensive B-36 program, thus prompting 
congressional hearings on the subjects. The Vinson hearings of 1949 gave the Navy a 
forum in which to plead its case for balanced forces capable of a wide range of 
conventional and nuclear warfare [Ref. 6:p. 294]. The Vinson committee report, 
completed in March 1950, sympathized with the Navy's advocacy of balanced forces and 
also indicated that army and air force officers were not competent to determine which 
weapons were necessary for the sea service [Ref. 6: p. 295]. The Navy was beginning to 
win support in Congress and build the momentum to carry it into a new era. The Korean 
War would provide the catalyst to begin the rebuilding of the U.S. Navy. 
Though not a naval war, the Korean War emphasized the need for increased 
spending in all areas of defense in the face of communist aggression. It opened the eyes 
of the American public as to just how far the United States' military might had 
deteriorated. It also solidified the Communist Bloc, led by the Soviet Union, as a clear 
and present threat to the national security of the United States. The Navy was prepared 
for this re-awakening and presented its plan for a naval force and naval doctrine to 
counter the Soviet threat to American national security. 
Naval doctrine for meeting the Soviet threat was an extension of the Mahanian 
principle of sea control. The Navy would not stop at merely engaging an enemy fleet; it 
would carry the fight to an enemy's shores. The Navy had proven its ability to project 
power ashore in the air raids and amphibious operations of World War EL The role and 
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capabilities of the aircraft carrier would expand. The new Forrestal class of "super- 
carrier" was designed with the capabilities necessary for this role. Smaller nuclear 
weapons were developed that could be employed by carrier-based aircraft. The Navy was 
molding itself into a strategic nuclear force. 
Another key doctrine for the new Navy was an increased emphasis on anti- 
submarine warfare. Both World Wars had demonstrated the serious threat that a 
relatively small number of submarines could present to even the most powerful navies. 
By 1950, the Soviet Union had approximately 350 submarines [Ref. 6:p. 295]. To 
counter this threat, the Navy increased its acquistion of anit-submarine platforms, 
including destroyers and frigates. 
The Navy also created doctrine to expand the role of its own submarine forces. 
As early as 1946, the Navy began conducting experiments testing the ability to launch 
pilotless, cruise missile-type craft from submarines [Ref. 6:p. 307]. Experiments in the 
area of propulsion systems led to the successful development of nuclear power as a means 
of submarine propulsion. The nuclearization of the submarine force in the 1950's and 
1960's increased the role of the submarine in naval doctrine. The submarine was now a 
true stealth platform that could perform a variety of missions: anti-surface warfare, anti- 
submarine warfare, strike warfare using cruise missiles, intelligence gathering, and most 
importantly, strategic deterrence. The marriage of the nuclear submarine and the ballistic 
missile secured the Navy's hold on one third of the strategic triad. 
The Navy had indeed transformed itself into its vision of a strategic force. As a 
result, the Navy now had doctrine for all the levels of warfare (tactical, operational, and 
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Strategie) and the means by which it could employ this doctrine. The Cold War Navy and 
its doctrine would last until the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.   Once this 
occurred, the Navy again found itself without the mission and purpose to which it had 
molded its force structure and doctrine.    More than one hundred years after its 
introduction, Mahanian doctrine seems to have run its course.   Naval doctrine is now 
being influenced by the writings of Sir Julian Corbett's treatise, Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy [Ref. 12:p. 7].  Corbett stresses the use of naval forces in support of 
land forces while controlling the local sea areas, not necessarily gaining total command of 
the sea. These ideas are evident in the naval documents ...From the Sea and Forward... 
From the Sea.  The new direction and doctrines for the Navy still are being determined. 
An ever-changing geopolitical situation and the lack of a clear threat make this a difficult 
task. The current potential for a revolution in military affairs as a result of the influence 
information technology further complicates the Navy's situation. In this environment, the 
doctrine development process must be careful and thorough. 
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III. THE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
A.   U.S. NAVY'S DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (1973-1993) 
The history of the doctrine development process in the U.S. Navy is more difficult 
to track than the doctrine itself. Little documentation exists for past processes, and the 
documentation that does exist is difficult to find. A few remaining Naval Warfare 
Publications exist that outline the general details of the process from the early 1970s to 
the 1990s. The process delineated in these publications deals only with tactical doctrine. 
Doctrine for the higher levels of warfare was not formally developed and promulgated. It 
was resident in the traditions of the Navy and some important treatises, primarily 
Mahan's writings [Ref. 12:p. 7]. The doctrine development process of this era had all of 
the key elements for successful doctrine: maintenance and promulgation of a doctrinal 
library, concept development, and experimentation. 
The Navy recognized the importance of maintaining its hard-earned knowledge. 
This knowledge management assumed the form of a library of tactical, doctrinal, and 
procedural publications. This library included Naval Warfare Publications (NWP), Fleet 
Exercise Publications (FXP), and Allied Tactical Publications (ATP), as well as many 
others [Ref. 13:p. 1-1]. Naval Warfare Publication 0 (NWP 0), in its various revisions 
through the years, provided the instruction for the development of new publications and 
the review and maintenance of existing publications. It put in place the basic framework 
that still exists today. 
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NWP 0 created the Primary Review Authority (PRA), the Coordinating Review 
Authority (CRA), the Technical Review Authority (TRA), Contributing Commands (CC), 
and a clearinghouse for producing doctrinal publications. The PRA was designated as the 
commander with the overall responsibility for the review of a specific tactical doctrine 
publication within the Navy [Ref. 13:p. 1-7]. The PRA is responsible for collecting, 
reviewing, and compiling inputs for doctrinal publications and submitting them to the 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) via both Fleet Commanders [Ref. 13:p. 1-7]. The CRA 
coordinates all inputs regarding a publication from his respective fleet prior to submission 
to the PRA [Ref. 13:p. 1-8]. A TRA functions similarly to a PRA, but deals with 
technical or administrative areas [Ref. 13:p. 1-8]. Commands such as the Judge 
Advocate General, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery are examples of TRAs for their respective publications. Contributing commands 
were defined as any command that provided input for tactical publications [Ref. 13:p. 1- 
8]. The clearinghouse for publishing and distributing publications was the Navy Tactical 
Doctrine Activity (later changed to the Navy Tactical Support Activity, 
NAVTACSUPPACT) [Ref. 13:p. 1-9]. NAVTACDOCACT was assigned the 
responsibility for processing all of the recommended changes received and submitting 
these changes to the CNO for approval prior to distribution [Ref. 13:p. 1-9]. 
The process for reviewing and revising publications was linear and tedious. 
Recommendations and revisions flowed through many levels and were tied to a strict 
schedule of reviews. Each publication was placed on a schedule for review. When the 
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CRA, who reviewed and consolidated the inputs before submitting them to the PRA, who 
reviewed the inputs and submitted recommendations for changes to the CNO and 
NAVTACDOCACT [Ref. 13]. Items considered to be of such vital importance as to 
warrant immediate change could be submitted by naval message (Fig. 1) [Ref. 13:p. 1- 
18]. Routine changes, however, were held until the next review cycle arrived. Dependent 
on the review schedule, valid changes could be delayed for years.the review process was 
instituted with the purpose of keeping doctrine current, but it resulted in a system that 
provided more convenience for the publishing activity than utility for the war fighter. 
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Concept development and experimentation are essential for the creation of new 
doctrine and are alluded to, but not directly discussed in NWP 0. In a section discussing 
new tactics, NWP 0 states: 
Commands are encouraged to recommend new tactics for fleet 
evaluation. While individual commands are discouraged from 
promulgating their own tactics and procedures for routine operations, they 
may employ special procedures for preliminary evaluation of new tactics 
[Ref. 13:p. 1-2]. 
This quote comes from the 1973 revision D, and demonstrates that in the early 1970s, the 
fleet was the main source for the development of concepts and also the main test bed for 
these concepts. NWP 0, revision L, promulgated in 1981, provided new procedures for 
new doctrine and tactics with the Navy's Tactical Development and Evaluation (TAC 
D&E) program [Ref.  14:p.  1-16].    The TAC D&E management organization was 
established and contained elements from the fleet CINCs, fleet commanders, type 
commanders, and special development commands.  Some products of this program were 
lessons   learned,   Tactical   Memorandums   (TACMEMOS),   and   Tactical   Notes 
(TACNOTES).  This system provided a hierarchy for concepts under development.  As 
new concepts or tactics were tested and evaluated they progressed up the hierarchy until 
incorporated into a Naval Warfare Publication. TACMEMOS could be developed while 
major systems were under development and provide basic tactical doctrine once the 
system met initial operational capability. TACMEMOS were cancelled automatically 
after two years unless incorporated into a TACNOTE or NWP. TACNOTES promulgate 
tactics and procedures that have been fully tested and accepted.   If a discrepancy was 
noted between a TACNOTE and an NWP, the TACNOTE took precedence as it was the 
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most recently approved publication.   TACNOTES, like TACMEMOs were cancelled 
after two years if not incorporated into an NWP. 
As mentioned earlier, this process had all three of the key elements for successful 
doctrine development: a doctrine library, concept development, and experimentation. 
The problem was that the elements were not tied closely enough together. Concept 
development must begin with a thorough search of existing doctrine. This prevents 
redundant doctrine. Concepts that have been developed and tested must be promulgated 
to the fleet in a timely fashion. For these things to occur, there must be direct 
communication between the organizations that develop and test doctrine and those that 
publish it. Periodic reviews and long chains of submission prevented the timely 
adaptation of new developments and led to a stagnant doctrine library. The fall of the 
Soviet Union and the lessons of the Gulf War highlighted a need for sweeping changes in 
doctrine. Naval leaders realized that the existing process was flawed and a new process 
was needed to develop the new doctrine. 
B.        NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND (1993-1998) 
The concept of a naval organization with the sole responsibility of developing, 
evaluating, and disseminating doctrine began to gain popularity in the Navy by the early 
1990s. In April 1992, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations focused the efforts along these 
lines with this statement: 
...The decision has been made to establish a Naval Doctrine Center. This 
new command will fill a long standing void within the Navy by providing 
an organizational focus for dealing with the development, dissemination 
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and evaluation of doctrine. This new center will also serve as the vehicle 
for working with other services to develop complimentary doctrine.. .[Ref. 
15] 
The wheels were set in motion for the new organization. The next year would bring naval 
leaders together to discuss concepts for the new "naval concepts and doctrine center." In 
January 1993, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso, issued the charter for 
the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC), the first formal doctrine center in the history of the 
U.S. Navy [Ref. 16]. 
The mission of the Naval Doctrine Command was made up of seven basic 
functions [Ref. 15]. NDC was to serve as the primary centralizing authority for the 
development of naval concepts and for the development and evaluation of Navy (USN) 
and naval (USN/USMC) doctrine. It also would provide for a unity of effort in 
Navy/Marine Corps doctrine development. NDC would act as the naval voice in joint 
and combined doctrine development. It would establish and conduct close liaison with 
the Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC), joint, combined, and other 
service doctrine centers. NDC would work directly with Navy/Marine Corps centers of 
excellence, Navy training and education commands, and the Fleet. In coordination with 
the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) and appropriate naval training 
commands, NDC would ensure that Navy, naval, and joint doctrine would be addressed 
in training and education curricula, and in operations, exercises and war games. Lastly, 
NDC would serve as a member of the Navy lessons learned committee and Tactical 
Development and Evaluation steering committee. 
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Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the Naval Doctrine Command 
To accomplish these functions, NDC was organized into four divisions: the 
Strategy and Concepts Division, the Naval Doctrine Division, the Joint and Combined 
Doctrine Division, and the Evaluation, Training, and Education Division (Fig. 2) [Ref. 
15]. Each of these divisions had a set of tasks for which it was responsible. The Strategy 
and Concepts Division had the primary task of evaluating the impact of national security 
strategy, national military strategy, new strategic concepts, national defense policy, and 
contingency planning on naval doctrine. This division also would coordinate the 
development of naval strategic and operational concepts that would influence doctrine 
development and fleet operations. It would serve as the Navy's central point of contact 
for strategic concept development matters and global war gaming.  The Naval Doctrine 
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Division would be responsible for coordinating the development of Navy and naval 
doctrine with fleet and Marine Corps war fighting centers of excellence to address the 
operational level of warfare.   Another important function of this division would be to 
develop and maintain Navy and naval doctrine to link naval tactical doctrine with joint 
and combined doctrine. It also would be the central point of contact for the development 
of Navy and naval tactical and operational doctrine.  This division also would assist the 
Fleet and war fighting centers of excellence in the identification of tactical deficiencies in 
NWPs and fleet tactics.    The final major responsibility of this division was that of 
disseminating doctrine via Naval Warfare Publications and other doctrinal publications. 
The Joint and Combined Doctrine Division was the coordinated USN/USMC voice in 
joint air/land/sea/space and combined doctrine development. It served as the Navy CRA 
for joint, multi-service, and combined doctrine and tactics.    The last division, the 
Evaluation, Training, and Education Division, was responsible for ensuring that all levels 
and types of doctrine were included in training and educational curricula.  This division 
also was tasked with assessing current doctrine during regularly scheduled war games. 
Another important function of this division was to sponsor war games and Doctrine 
Review Advisory Group (DRAG) meetings to validate newly developed concepts and 
doctrine. 
Early products from NDC showed promise. The Naval Doctrine Publications 
(NDP) were the first attempt at creating a formal operational level doctrine in the Navy. 
These ca 
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pstone publications described the roles of U.S. naval forces and disseminated operational 
level principles for employment [Ref. 17:p. 1-2]. They linked naval strategy to TTP and 
were primarily educational publications. NDPs were developed in the areas of overall 
naval warfare (NDP 1), naval intelligence (NDP 2), naval operations (NDP 3), naval 
logistics (NDP 4), naval plans (NDP 5), and command and control (NDP 6). 
NDC had all of the mechanisms in place to create a successful doctrine 
development process. The Strategy and Concepts Division was the tool for generating 
concepts. The Education, Training, and Evaluation Division provided the mechanism for 
evaluating the doctrine in practice as well as a means for identifying areas for 
experimentation. The Naval Doctrine Division, supported by NAVTACSUPPACT, 
became the producer and custodian for the doctrine library. With the inclusion of the 
Joint and Combined Doctrine division, NDC addressed all types of doctrine at all levels 
of warfare (Fig. 3) 













Figure 3. Levels of War and Levels of Doctrine 
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Despite the promising initial products  and the presence of the necessary 
mechanisms for doctrine development, NDC did not fill the mission for which it was 
intended.   There were several factors that contributed to this failure.   NDC fulfilled 
prophecies that it would be cut off from fleet input and become a stovepipe for doctrine. 
The physical location of NDC, in Norfolk, Virginia, ensured that it would be heavily 
influenced by politics and the local commands (e.g. CINCLANTFLT). In this situation, 
fleet commanders did not feel they had much input into the products from NDC, and they 
were thus less likely to use them. Another problem at NDC was the lack of funding and 
scheduling for experimentation.    Concepts cannot progress beyond concepts without 
experimentation.   If existing concepts are not developed, new concepts will stop being 
generated. The vision for the Naval Doctrine Command had placed concept development 
as the center of gravity for the organization. In the vision's implementation, the center of 
gravity became the support of the Naval Warfare Publication library.   This was the 
situation that plagued NDC.   The Naval Doctrine Command was a very timely and 
innovative experiment in doctrine development.   Fortunately, naval leaders recognized 
the beneficial aspects of NDC as well as its problems aspects. In June 1998, the Chief of 
Naval Operations disestablished the Naval Doctrine Command and established the Navy 
Warfare Development Command with the intent of capitalizing on the recent lessons 
learned. 
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C.       NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND 
The Navy's path of doctrine led to its current doctrine center: the Navy Warfare 
Development Command. NWDC was designed to serve a unique role, based upon the 
model of the Naval Doctrine Command, but with several key differences. Today, NWDC 
serves as the Navy's crossroads for innovation, transformation, doctrine, and concept 
development [Ref. 18:p. 1]. The next sections explore how NWDC fills this role by 
examining the following areas: the establishment and mission statement of NWDC, the 
NWDC command process, NWDC's doctrine department process, and the new idea of 
Web-Enabled Doctrine. 
1.        The Establishment of NWDC and Its Mission Statement 
The Navy Warfare Development Command was created as a replacement for the 
Naval Doctrine Command. NDC had not fulfilled the expectations of Navy leadership or 
the fleet. It was decided that the best way to capitalize on the good points of NDC, while 
avoiding its pitfalls, was to establish a completely new and separate command in a 
different location. 
Newport, Rhode Island was chosen as the location for the new command. There 
are two primary reasons that Newport was selected. First of all, Newport is 
geographically distant from any major operational commands or political centers (e.g. 
Washington, D.C). By locating the new command in Newport, Navy leadership hoped to 
lessen political or command influences that could hamper the doctrine development 
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process. The second main benefit of Newport as a location is that the new command 
would be co-located with the Naval War College (NWC) and the Strategic Studies Group 
(SSG). These three organizations would form a unique triumvirate for strategic and 
doctrinal concept development. NWDC would conduct current doctrine development, 
concentrating on a 5-10 year timeframe for new concepts. SSG would experiment with 
future concepts on a 20-25 year timeframe. NWC would provide the academic validation 
for new concepts with historical and empirical analysis. The coordination between these 
three organizations provides exciting possibilities for doctrine development. 
NWDC was not created as a completely stand alone command. One of the 
problems of NDC was that it became somewhat isolated from the fleet and other 
commands. To hedge against this possibility in the new command, NWDC was tied 
closely to the War College. The President of the Naval War College was designated as 
the Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) for NWDC [Ref. 19]. The OPNAV notice 
that disestablished NDC, issued in June 1998, included three main parts. First, it 
disestablished NDC and NAVTACSUPPACT [Ref. 19]. The second part was a mission 
modification statement for the NWC [Ref. 19]. The last part was the establishment of the 
Navy Warfare Development Command [Ref. 19]. 
The Naval War College always has been a center for strategic thought. The new 
mission statement expanded this role to include: 
...[assisting] in the development of Navy strategy, ...[acting] as the center 
for research and gaming leading to the development of advanced 
operational and war fighting concepts, ...[coordinating] NWC support for 
concept development, experimentation and doctrine development; to 
approve Navy warfare doctrine and concepts... [Ref. 19]. 
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With this new mission statement and its role as NWDC's ISIC, NWC now was intimately 
tied into the doctrine development process. 
The mission statement for NWDC set the foundation for the new command. 
Inevitably, there are some similarities between the mission of NDC and NWDC. NWDC 
was created to absorb and expand upon all of the functions of NDC. Despite this, there 
are some important differences. NWDC's initial mission statement tasked it to: 
...serve as the primary Navy point of contact for the development of 
Navy operational and war fighting concepts, naval doctrine and joint 
and combined doctrine development; to plan and coordinate experiments 
employing emerging operational concepts; to represent the Navy with 
joint and other service battle laboratories/facilities and tactical 
development commands; to ensure naval and joint doctrine are forwarded 
for incorporation in training and education curricula; to publish and 
disseminate naval doctrine; and, to perform such other functions and 
tasks as may be assigned by higher authority [Ref. 19]. 
The bolded items in the mission statement illustrate a key characteristic of NWDC that 
provides the potential for success.   For the first time, a single command has the three 
functions necessary for doctrine development (concept development, experimentation, 
and doctrine library maintenance) consolidated under one roof. NWDC had been given 
the tasking for these functions, and the next step was to create an organizational structure 
and process to accomplish them. 
2.        Current Command Organization and Process 
Creating an organization to accomplish all of the interrelated functions of doctrine 
development was a difficult task.    It is obvious that there must be a department 
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responsible for each of the individual functions required for doctrine development. What 
is not so obvious however, is how these departments should relate and interact during the 
development process. 
The following descriptions of the NWDC organization and command process 
present NWDC's vision of how the process is designed to work. This vision has been 
promulgated as the way NWDC will attempt to accomplish its mission. As with any 
process, it does not always proceed in the prescribed manner. This is especially true with 
the NWDC process since it is still in its initial implementation. 
NWDC is divided into four departments: Concept Development, Doctrine, the 












Figure 4. Organizational Structure of the Navy Warfare Development Command 
The Concept Development department is expected to provide the fuel for innovation 
[Ref. 20]. It is designed to be responsible for gleaning concepts from various sources and 
"fleshing them out" until they provide a viable basis for experimentation. The Doctrine 
department serves several functions. It maintains and provides a doctrinal baseline from 
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which the Concept Development department can begin its development of new concepts 
[Ref. 20]. It also acts as the voice and ears of NWDC by promulgating doctrinal products 
to the fleet and receiving feedback from the fleet on those products. The Maritime Battle 
Center is the experimentation arm of NWDC. It should coordinate with Concept 
Development and Doctrine to plan for the experimentation of concepts in development. 
MBC also is the main vehicle for maintaining relationships with fleet commanders, 
mainly established during the planning of Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) [Ref. 20]. 
Operations department is responsible for the research and analysis that is necessary for 
evaluation of tested concepts. They or their subcontractors collect and compare 
experimental findings, publish those findings, and if required, make recommendations for 
concepts requiring further experimentation [Ref. 20]. 
The industrial principles of scientific management and assembly line production 
are unlikely to lead to a dynamic development process. By applying traditional industrial 
principles to the NWDC organization, one might design a linear process such as: 
(l)Concept Development generates new concepts for testing; (2)MBC schedules and 
conducts experimentation of the new concepts; (3)Operations evaluates the results and 
determines if the concept is ready to be formalized as doctrine or needs more testing; 
(4)Doctrine takes the approved concept, folds it into doctrine and promulgates it to the 
fleet. This process ignores the interrelationship of the functions of the different 
departments. These departments must work together synergistically for the development 
of doctrine. Fortunately, NWDC has recognized the intricacies of the situation and has 
developed a process with this in mind. For this process, there is a coordinating entity, the 
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Warfare Innovation Supervisory Board (WISB), which represents the Commander's 
senior leadership [Ref. 20]. The WISB provides strategic oversight for the 
accomplishment of NWDC's mission through a coordinated process [Ref. 20]. This 
process is broken down into five phases: process initiation, FBE planning and execution, 
analysis and review, product development, and doctrine promulgation [Ref. 20]. 
Phase I, process initiation, begins with the WISB establishing timelines and 
departmental points of contact (POC) for new development projects [Ref. 20]. During 
Phase I, the Concept Development, Operations, and Doctrine departments begin a 
collective front-end analysis and, if required, the war gaming or limited objective 
experimentation for proposed concepts [Ref. 20]. Phase n, FBE planning and execution, 
is headed primarily by MBC. During this phase, MBC coordinates and conducts the 
Concept Finalization Conference, the FBE Initial Planning Conference, the Main 
Planning Conference, the Final Planning Conference, and FBE execution [Ref. 20]. It is 
during this phase that most of the fleet involvement occurs. The numbered fleet 
commanders have substantial input to the process in planning FBEs, recommending 
concepts for development, and identifying the doctrinal needs of the fleet. Phase m, 
analysis and review, falls under the purview of Operations department. In this phase, 
Operations department collects and compares experimental findings as described above. 
Phase IV, product development, is headed by Doctrine department and consists of product 
proposals and doctrine formulation. Phase V, promulgation, is the approval and 
dissemination of dynamically developed doctrine. The last three of these phases do 
progress in a fairly linear fashion, one cannot proceed without the prior being completed, 
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but the process is not compartmentalized. Phase I is where most of the collaboration 
between the departments occurs. 
This collaboration is achieved through the use of Warfare Innovation 
Development Teams (WIDT) and CODE (Concepts, Operations, Doctrine, 
Experimentation) Teams [Ref. 20]. The WIDT is comprised of resident subject matter 
experts (SME) from each department [Ref. 20]. A WIDT serves the Concept lead as the 
research entity for the development, collection, and maturation of concepts, test doctrine, 
and fleet experiment requests [Ref. 20]. This collaboration at the beginning of the 
process is the key to establishing relationships and cooperation throughout the process. 
The CODE Team is made up of members from each of the departments and selected 
WIDT members [Ref. 20]. The CODE team does not come into play until Phase n. 
During the phases, the lead department's representative heads the team and directs its 
efforts [Ref. 20]. For example, during Phase II, the MBC lead member heads the team's 
efforts in researching and planning for FBEs and experiment facilitation during FBE 
execution. This continues for the remainder of the process and provides an avenue for 
communication between the departments. Without the use of these teams, the process 
runs the risk of becoming linear and losing synergy. 
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Figure 5. NWDC Command Process Diagram, from Ref. [20] 
Figure 5 shows a representation of the NWDC command process. It shows how 
the CODE teams, WIDTs, and NWDC departments are directed by the WISB for the 
entire process. The left side of the diagram shows the fleet inputs to the process through 
the TAC D&E program, fleet commanders, and the Navy Lessons Learned System. The 
connecting arrows show how all departments should have involvement at every phase of 
the process. 
3.        Current Doctrine Department Organization and Process 
The Doctrine department at NWDC has had to create a vision for its own process 
within the command process. Like the NWDC command process described earlier, it is 
in the first stages of implementation.   The following description is a representation of 
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how the Doctrine department intends for the process to work. Many parts of this plan are 
in place and functioning, while others have yet to be implemented fully. 
The final product of NWDC is intended to be "dynamically developed" doctrine. 
This dynamic development can only occur when the producers of doctrine know the 
needs of the users of doctrine. At NWDC, the Doctrine department acts as the 
mouthpiece, promulgating doctrine throughout the fleet. The Doctrine department also is 
the entity responsible for the maintenance of current doctrine. In fulfilling this latter 
function, the Doctrine department must have a mechanism in place for receiving feedback 
on the relevance of existing doctrine and the need for new doctrine. The primary means 
for feedback from doctrine users has been the normal review cycle for publications. This 
is essentially the same mechanism that has been in place for the last thirty years. The 
other method for input is the naval message format for urgent or routine changes, which 
was discussed earlier. A recent addition to the Doctrine department toolbox is the Navy 
Doctrine Working Party (NDWP). It has become the Doctrine department's primary 
means for the proposal, validation, and revision of Navy basic (strategic) and operational 
doctrine and Navy inputs into Joint doctrine [Ref. 21:p. 4]. The Doctrine department has 
created a doctrine development process centered around the NDWP and its other input 
mechanisms. 
It is necessary to describe the NDWP further before delving into the process itself. 
The NDWP is a forum, which brings together a wide range of Navy organizations to 
discuss current doctrinal issues and act as full partners in the development of Navy 
doctrine [Ref. 21 :p. 4]. The Executive Steering Committee of the NDWP is made up of 
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representatives from Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT); 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT); Commander in Chief, U.S. 
Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR); Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command (COMUSNAVCENT) and Commander Navy Warfare Development 
Command (Facilitator) as members [Ref. 22]. The Advisory Committee consists of 
representatives from Numbered Fleets, CARGRUs, DESGRUs, TYCOMs, OPNAV, 
PHIBGRUs, and Warfare Centers of Excellence [Ref. 22]. The NDWP is hosted twice 
annually by NWDC. The NDWP serves as the starting point for all development of new 
doctrine and a vast majority of the revision of current doctrine. 
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Figure 6. Doctrine Development Process Flowchart 
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The doctrine development process consists of 13 steps. Figure 6 (Fig. 6) 
illustrates a flowchart of the process with the title of each step and the entity responsible 
for the completion of that step. Each of these steps will be described fully in the 
following paragraphs. 
The first step in the process is the submission of a proposal to the NDWP for 
review. Proposals may be presented to the NDWP by a Navy major command, center of 
excellence, or senior leadership board [Ref. 21:p. 9]. The purpose of the proposal is to 
present a concept for a new doctrine document to the NDWP. As part of the proposal 
briefing, NWDC presents a front-end assessment of the proposal [Ref. 21 :p. 9]. The 
proposal is evaluated according to three criteria: appropriateness, distinctiveness, and 
sufficiency [Ref. 21 :p. 10]. Appropriateness means that the proposal was developed at 
the correct level of doctrine. Distinctiveness means that the proposal has a unique 
character not covered by existing doctrine. Sufficiency means that the proposal is 
supported by material and information. A proposal must address all of these 
requirements before being approved for development into doctrine [Ref. 21:p. 10]. 
The second step in the process is NDWP validation of the proposal. The NDWP 
acts as a corporate body to validate proposals for development of basic (strategic) and 
operational Navy doctrine documents [Ref. 21 :p. 4]. The NDWP also decides if current 
doctrine publications should be revised [Ref. 21:p. 4]. The last function of the NDWP is 
to consolidate Navy positions on the different topics to be covered at the subsequent Joint 
Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) [Ref. 21 :p. 4]. 
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The third step in the development process is the refinement of the concept and 
scope. NWDC will designate a PRA and CRAs to develop the proposed NWP [Ref. 
21 :p. 10]. The PRA is responsible for establishing milestones for developing, 
researching, and writing the doctrine [Ref. 21 :p. 10]. The PRA works closely with the 
proposing office to determine the general scope and key elements of the proposal to be 
discussed in the next step of the process [Ref. 21 :p. 11]. 
The fourth step in the process is researching and outlining and is conducted by the 
Program Directive Working Group (PDWG). The PDWG is a group of subject matter 
experts (SMEs) assembled by NWDC to develop a program directive and initial outline 
of a new NDWP [Ref. 21 :p. 4]. The NWDC Action Officer (AO) reviews the doctrine 
proposal and NDWP approval to determine the general scope and direction of the 
document and conducts initial research on the topic in coordination with SMEs [Ref. 
21 :p. 11]. The AO then creates an initial outline that will be forwarded to members of the 
PDWG as read-ahead material for the PDWG meeting. During the PDWG meeting, 
significant milestones are discussed, the document outline is "fleshed-out," and chapters, 
key points, and main supporting topic sentences are generated [Ref. 21:p. 11]. Following 
the PDWG meeting, the AO disseminates the approved outline along with the planned 
milestones for the remainder of the development [Ref. 21 :p. 11]. 
The fifth step in the process is the development of the draft publication by the 
PRA. The PRA bases the draft on the approved outline from the PDWG [Ref. 21 :p. 11]. 
If necessary, the PRA may assign portions of the draft to be written by contractors or 
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members of the PDWG [Ref. 21 :p. 11]. The primary consideration for this draft is 
content [Ref. 2 l:p. 11]. 
The sixth step in the process is the internal review and distribution for comment. 
NWDC staff conducts this step. The purpose of this step is to use the doctrine expertise 
that exists within NWDC to improve the NWP draft [Ref. 21:p. 12]. The focus of this 
review will be on readability, overall doctrinal tone, and consistency with already 
approved doctrine [Ref. 21 :p. 12]. The NWDC AO for the NWP is to prepare a 
transmittal message for Commander, NWDC release tasking CINCs and COEs to review 
the doctrine and provide comments directly to the NWDC AO [Ref. 21 :p. 12]. The draft 
publication is then either placed on the NWDC website with password protection or 
distributed by e-mail or fax to the designated reviewers [Ref. 21:p. 12]. 
The seventh step in the process consists of the review and comments. The 
purpose of this step is to give the draft publication the widest possible dissemination for 
review and comment [Ref. 21 :p. 12]. NDWP members have 60 days to distribute each 
draft NWP through their organizations, have it reviewed, and consolidate comments in a 
line in-line out format [Ref. 21:p. 12]. The AO is to keep copies of all responses for 
records purposes [Ref. 21 :p. 12]. 
The eighth step in the process is comment resolution. The AO is responsible for 
revising the NWP as necessary based on the inputs received [Ref. 21 :p. 13]. The AO also 
is to resolve comments at the point of contact level, or if required, directly with the 
originator of the comment [Ref. 21 :p. 10]. If the AO and commenting POC are unable to 
resolve issues, the disagreement is to be escalated up the chain of command [Ref. 21 :p. 
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13].   All critical and major comments must be viewed by all voting members of the 
NDWP prior to beginning the preparation of the final product [Ref. 21 :p. 13]. 
The ninth step in the process is designed to be the preparation of the final 
coordination draft. After the AO has incorporated or resolved all comments, the NWP is 
put into final draft format [Ref. 21:p. 13]. The Navy Terminologist conducts a formal 
terminology review of the publication [Ref. 21 :p. 13]. Vignettes, pictures, and quotes are 
added to the publication to add relevance and readability [Ref. 21 :p. 13]. After final 
editing, the document is closed to further changes [Ref. 21 :p. 13]. 
The tenth step in the process is the final review and commenting. This step is 
similar to the initial review and comments in step seven. This review is only 30 days 
long vice the 60 in the initial review. Final received changes are incorporated and the 
document is sent to the Commander, NWDC (CNWDC)[Ref. 21 :p. 13]. 
The eleventh step in the process is approval. For NDPs, the CNO is the approval 
authority. CNWDC is the approval authority for all other doctrine products [Ref. 21:p. 
14]. 
The twelfth step in the doctrine development process is publishing. The NWDC 
publications manager converts the document into electronic file format (.pdf) for 
placement in the Navy Warfare Electronic Library (NWEL) for distribution via compact 
disk [Ref. 21 :p. 14]. The publications manager also provides hard copies via the print on 
demand system [Ref. 21 :p. 14]. The AO creates a record set to reflect the development 
history of the publication [Ref. 21 :p. 14]. This record set will include: hard and 
electronic copies of the final publication, all versions of drafts formally staffed, all 
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significant comments received during coordination and resolution, any guidance issued 
during the publication development, and any other material deemed significant by the AO 
[Ref. 21 :p. 14]. 
The thirteenth step in the process is the assessment for revision. This is an 
ongoing step during the life of a publication. The periodic review is the primary means of 
assessment and is conducted at the NDWP on an every other year basis [Ref. 21 :p. 15]. 
AOs present briefings to the NDWP recommending major revision, minor revision, or no 
revision to the NWP [Ref. 21 :p. 15]. The NDWP validates all proposals related to 
changes in doctrine [Ref. 21:p. 15]. A publication maybe recommended for an out-of- 
cycle review by the CNO, CNWDC, or NWDP members and is subject to and NDWP 
vote [Ref. 21 :p. 15]. 
4.        Web-Enabled Doctrine 
The doctrine process as it exists makes limited use of the functionality provided 
by information technology tools. To this point, the most extensive use of information 
technology has been in the area of dissemination. Draft publications are transferred by e- 
mail and made accessible via password-protected websites. The major method of 
distributing final doctrine products is via the NWEL CDs. These limited applications of 
information technology have increased the speed of draft reviews and product 
promulgation, but have not significantly affected the content of the product. NWDC's 
Doctrine department has implemented a new plan for Web-Enabled Doctrine that 
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incorporates the use of web-based doctrine development tools for the collection and 
evaluation of fleet inputs as well as the dissemination of products. 
One of the prime motives for the Web-Enabled Doctrine plan is to increase fleet 
participation in the doctrine process. In the past, Fleet participation has been limited by 
several factors. The process was timeline driven, resulting in cyclical opportunities to 
participate. The cyclical process often failed to intersect with the operational cycles of 
much of the Fleet. The process was a low-visibility, behind-the-scenes type of 
undertaking. The Fleet was not familiar with the process and the need for its 
participation. In this system, doctrine grew stagnant. To alleviate these problems, the 
Web-Enabled Doctrine initiative incorporates the use of the web-based newsgroup model 
in the doctrine process. 
The application of this model has the potential for many benefits for the doctrine 
development process. Web access allows a far larger audience to participate in the 
process [Ref. 23]. The ability for constant review through web access unties the process 
from the timeline and rigid schedules [Ref. 23]. Operators can "strike while the iron is 
hot" rather than having to wait for the formal review procedures. Web access allows for 
higher visibility of the process throughout the fleet [Ref. 23]. The reduction in paperwork 
and administrative burden encourages participation in the process [Ref. 23]. The 
newsgroup format allows a forum for open discussions that may stimulate dialog and 
serve as a breeding ground for new concept innovation [Ref. 23]. The newsgroup model 
provides a subscription function that notifies key individuals of comments or suggestions 
regarding certain issues, thus creating a "community of practice [Ref. 23]."    The 
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overarching benefit of this tool is that it increases Fleet awareness and ownership of Navy 
doctrine. 
The initial stages of this plan have already begun. In August 2000, CNWDC 
described his vision for the Web-Enabled Doctrine initiative to the Doctrine department 
at NWDC. Within three days, the prototype system had been designed and a working 
model was created. The beta system consisted of a Microsoft Access97 database with a 
Cold Fusion interface. It was populated with seven publications (newsgroups) for testing. 
The system was demonstrated to CNWDC, who then briefed the CNO on the plan at the 
end of August. In September 2000, the system was briefed and demonstrated to the 
NDWP. NDWP approved the plan and a timeline for the implementation of Web- 
Enabled Doctrine. By November 1, 2000, database population for the test site was 
completed and associated newsgroups were created. The test site now contained 390 
doctrine and TTP publications (in .pdf format) ready for review. A week later, the 
website was placed online for an initial testing period. Due to Navy policy, access to 
doctrinal publications is only allowable through a SEPRNET connection. A message was 
sent to NDWP members, requesting review and comments on the system. Testing and 
review continued for two months. In January 2001, NDWP responses were incorporated 
into the system, with some improvements ongoing. System IOC was reached on February 
6, 2001, and a Navy-wide message was issued, announcing the first implementation of 
Web-Enabled Doctrine. On that same day, the first Fleet response was received via the 
website. 
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It would seem that Web-Enabled Doctrine can be plugged directly into the 
existing process to reduce the timeline and widen the audience for review of publications. 
There are certain steps of the doctrine development process that easily can incorporate 
web-based tools.   NWDC's Doctrine department has recognized this and modified the 
doctrine development process to incorporate the new tools. The sixth step in the process, 
internal review and distribution, can utilize the web to allow the necessary personnel 
access to conduct their review and see other individuals' inputs.   This situation could 
produce a brainstoraiing effect of building upon ideas and improving the content.  The 
seventh step in the process, initial review and comments, can use Web-Enabled to 
doctrine to quickly disseminate draft material by making it accessible via the website. 
The newsgroup function could produce the same effect as in the previous step, but on a 
wider scale.   The eighth step in the process, resolution of comments, can utilize the 
newsgroup function to facilitate discussions on the validity of comments, leading to 
quicker resolutions of these issues. Web-Enabled Doctrine can facilitate the tenth step in 
the process, final review and comments, much in the same way as steps six and seven. 
The twelfth step in the process, doctrine publication, is made much more responsive than 
the NWEL CD distribution. New doctrinal or TTP publications can be posted in Web- 
Enabled Doctrine as soon as they are approved, rather than waiting for the next NWEL 
CD distribution. This ensures that the Fleet has access to the most up-to-date versions of 
publications.    The thirteenth step in the process, continuing assessment and review, is 
greatly enhanced by the use of Web-Enabled Doctrine. The Fleet no longer has to wait 
for the next review cycle or submit naval messages to address issues in doctrinal 
80 
publications. Input can be submitted immediately to a publication's PRA from any sailor 
with access to the Web-Enabled Doctrine tools. Inputs may represent an individual's 
views on an issue, or it may represent a command position. Either way, the new tool 
provides a significant voice for the Fleet with respect to the doctrine process. 
There are some technical aspects of the Web-Enabled Doctrine system that require 
further discussion. As stated before, all publication files are stored in .pdf format, which 
is readable primarily with Adobe Acrobat Reader. These data files, depending on the 
length of the publication and the method used for conversion to .pdf format, range in size 
from approximately 100 kilobytes to 15 megabytes. Many of the older, hard copy only 
publications had to be entered into digital format using optical scanners. This resulted in 
some of the larger file sizes. Publications that already existed in another electronic 
format could be converted into relatively small .pdf files. Due to bandwidth restrictions, 
the larger files are mainly inaccessible to ships at sea. Also mentioned briefly was the 
fact that the Web-Enabled Doctrine website is only accessible via SIPRNET. Many 
commands have limited SIPRNET access. These units are virtually cut off from the new 
system and must rely on the older, slower mechanisms for input. The problems of file 
size and SIPRNET only access are significant detractors from the system's accessibility. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF WEB-ENABLED DOCTRINE 
A.       WEB-ENABLED DOCTRINE AND THE WEB-BASED NAVY 
In December 2000, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral WJ. Fallon, 
chartered "Task Force Whiskey (TFW)", a working group composed of naval leaders and 
information technology experts, to develop an enterprise-wide information systems 
architecture for the Navy [Ref. 24:p. 3]. Previous implementations of information 
technology in the Navy resulted in a myriad of separate, non-interoperable databases and 
the lack of effective means to exchange information. Task Force Whiskey's goal was to 
develop a vision and overall plan to take advantage of web technologies to create an 
integrated architecture for information exchange in the Navy. TFW generated guidelines 
for an operational information systems architecture titled the Web-Based Navy (WBN). 
NWDC is tasked with tailoring Web-Enabled Doctrine tools to fit this proposed 
architecture. It is necessary to analyze the current Web-Enabled Doctrine implementation 
with respect to its degree of compliance with the proposed enterprise-wide architecture. 
This analysis will provide a roadmap to future implementations of Web-Enabled 
Doctrine. 
1.        Web-Based Navy Architecture 
It is necessary to further describe the Web-Based Navy Architecture before 
conducting an analysis of Web-Enabled Doctrine. It is important to note that the WBN is 
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still in the conceptual stages. With this in mind, the following description of the WBN 
presents a conceptual vision of how the system should perform and some of the emerging 
technologies that might bring these ideas into implementation. 
One of the key requirements for the WBN philosophy the ability to aggregate data 
from disparate enterprise-wide knowledge bases into information specific to the user's 
needs [Ref. 24:p. 5]. There are several characteristics of the web-based architecture that 
ensure this seamless operation. Databases will be decoupled from specific applications 
required to access them [Ref. 24:p. 5]. Portals will be the fundamental means by which 
information is accessed.  All naval personnel will have access to a customizable portal 
that presents information relevant to them [Ref. 24:p. 5].  The portals also will provide 
access to work flow management capabilities  such as training and maintenance 
management [Ref. 24:p. 5].   Emerging commercial standards for Web interoperability 
will be used to ensure data are "self-describing [Ref. 24:p. 5]." Data will be represented 
in a form that describes its content rather than the format in which it is displayed.  The 
last characteristic of the WBN is the implementation of Information Control (INFOCON) 
policies and configurations for authorized commanders to establish and control [Ref. 
24:p. 6]. The INFOCON program is analogous to the Navy Emission Control (EMCON) 
program for electromagnetic transmissions. 
WBN architecture relies heavily on the implementation of a three-tier information 
systems architecture [Ref. 24:p. 15]. This three-tier architecture consists of a 
presentation/client tier, an application tier, and a data/content tier [Ref. 24:p. 15]. The 
three tiers, with information assurance and inter-tier infrastructure, spanning all tiers, 
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interact to provide a single, common set of web-services to the user [Ref. 24:p. 15]. The 
presentation/client tier is represented in the WBN by the various user portals [Ref. 24:p. 
16]. These portals may be accessed via desktop or laptop computers, personal digital 
assistants (PDAs), or any other device with web access. The application tier is 
represented in the WBN by application servers [Ref. 24:p. 17]. In the WBN, a shore 
station may access applications at a geographically distant server, but an afloat unit may 
have local servers that provide local authentication, faster logon, and application use 
when connectivity is not available [Ref. 24:p. 17]. The data/content tier for the WBN 
consists of authoritative data centers located at the Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Area Master Stations (NCTAMS) for each area of responsibility 
(Pacific, Atlantic, European, and Central) [Ref. 24:p. 19]. The data will be replicated at 
each of the NCTAMS [Ref. 24:p. 19]. Business process owners will maintain their 
respective databases and update the authoritative data centers' database [Ref. 24:p. 19]. 
Some of these business process databases will be partially replicated and placed locally at 
afloat units as necessary [Ref. 24:p. 19]. The operational advantages of this type of data 
system are: global redundancy of data, elimination of unsynchronized data centers, 
automated load balancing at replicated data centers that increases the ease of access, 
improved security as a result of the global implementation of standard firewall 
configurations, the timely access of relevant authoritative mission critical data, ease of 
coordination with afloat unit operation centers for smart database replication and updates, 
and the avoidance of over saturation of single authoritative data sites [Ref. 24:p. 19]. 
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The key enabling technology for the implementation of the Web-Based Navy 
architecture is the development of "self-defining data." The computing model that has 
existed for decades ties data to specific functions and applications. The result of this 
model was the redundant storage of data in countless incompatible formats. The 
proliferation of the Internet during the 1990s necessitated the development of data 
formats that were usable by several different applications on various types of operating 
systems and computer hardware. The Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML) document 
was developed to fill this need. However, HTML only describes a common presentation 
for data. Data could not be manipulated using an HTML document. An emerging Web 
standard, extensible Markup Language (XML) provides the functionality that is 
necessary for the creation of "self-defining data." XML separates the definition, 
transmission, validation, and interpretation of data between applications from the display 
of the data through the use of designer specified data tags. These tags describe the 
content of the data rather than the presentation. Data in XML format is self-sufficient. It 
has meaning without being parsed by any application. This allows it to be used by any 
web-based application with access to the data-type dictionary. 
2.        Web Enabled-Doctrine Architecture Comparison 
NWDC's implementation of Web-Enabled Doctrine began in August 2000, while 
Task Force Whiskey did not even exist until December 2000. Because of this, it is not 
surprising that some disparities exist between the current implementation of Web- 
Enabled Doctrine and the WBN architecture. These differences are easily excusable, but 
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they must be addressed if the system is to mature and become a functioning part of the 
WBN. 
The primary obstacle in gaining Web-Enabled Doctrine compliance with WBN 
principles is the existing database. As mentioned in Chapter HI, the primary tool for 
Web-Enabled Doctrine is a Microsoft Access97 database with a Cold Fusion web- 
application server interface. Files are stored in the .pdf format only. The .pdf format was 
chosen mainly as a matter of convenience and to facilitate the fastest implementation of 
the system. These files are only accessible using the Adobe Acrobat Reader or 
compatible software. There is no capability to conduct a keyword search of documents in 
the database. Most of the .pdf files are too large to be transferred in a timely manner via 
the bandwidth available to the Fleet. Because the files are stored in this format, 
conversion to XML format is going to be an enormous undertaking. As daunting as the 
task may seem, it is absolutely necessary for compatibility within the WBN. 
The architecture of the Web-Enabled Doctrine system incorporates a basic 
implementation of the multiple-tier architecture. The Cold Fusion interface is an 
application service provider software that functions the same as an application server in 
the second tier of the three-tier architecture. This interface accesses the database through 
the Cold Fusion Markup Language, which is similar in format to HTML and XML. The 
main drawback of the Cold Fusion interface is that it is designed to interact with specific 
database products, such as Microsoft Access or Oracle. This is more a function of the 
existing database than a lack of capability in the software. Future versions of the software 
are likely to incorporate XML to increase the functionality of the interface. 
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Web-Enabled Doctrine departs significantly from the WBN architecture in the 
area of accessibility. The main obstacle to accessibility is the policy requirement that 
forces the website to be accessible via SIPRNET only. The Navy has yet to migrate 
towards the Private Key Infrastructure called for in the WBN architecture. As a result, 
the most extreme security measures are taken to prevent unauthorized access to doctrinal 
publications. SIPRNET access is difficult to come by in the Fleet. Access to SIPRNET 
terminals, when they exist, is severely restricted. Much of the Fleet is unable to reach the 
Web-Enabled Doctrine. This is in direct contrast with the assured access that is to span 
all levels of architecture in the WBN. 
B.        THE FUTURE OF WEB-ENABLED DOCTRINE 
Fortunately, key personnel at NWDC have recognized the issues discussed in the 
previous section. NWDC has developed a vision for the future of Web-Enabled Doctrine 
that incorporates the principles of the WBN architecture. There are obstacles to the 
implementation of this vision in the areas of manpower, policy, and technology. The 
policy problem has been discussed earlier with respect to system accessibility. This 
section will describe the functionality of the proposed system as well as the remaining 
obstacles related to manpower and technology. 
The Web-Enabled Doctrine of the future is often referred to as "user-defined 
doctrine." In this system, a user can access the doctrine database using the three-tiered 
architecture of the WBN. Once the database is accessed, the user can conduct publication 
searches based on key words or phrases.   The user will be able to enter a task or a 
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combination of tasks and the system will query the database and return results to the user 
that conform to their request. The future database will include the doctrinal publications, 
Fleet comments on those publications, and Navy Lessons Learned data. The system can 
present as much or as little of this related data as requested by the user. For example, if a 
user enters the key phrases "LCAC Operations" and "LPD-17", the system will provide 
the relevant doctrinal and TTP publications, Fleet comments on the publications, and 
lessons learned data relating to operating LCACs (Landing Craft Air Cushion) from an 
LPD-17 class ship. The user can restrict the data request to publication or lessons learned 
data only. The user defines their doctrinal needs, and the system provides the product. 
The ultimate incarnation of the system will depart totally from the current paradigm of 
separate publications and exist as a single doctrine source. 
There are current efforts at NWDC to plan for the database migration from .pdf 
files to XML formatted data. The first problem encountered by these efforts is the 
mountain of data reentry and reformatting that must be accomplished. Another 
significant concern is the creation of a common data dictionary by which all data in the 
WBN are defined. One solution to this problem is a proposal to use the Navy Mission 
Essential Tasks Lists (NMETL) as a basis for the data type dictionary. Naval tasks 
support every level of war: strategic, operational and tactical. These tasks are developed 
directly from doctrine and TTP. The NMETL is an extant system that has broken 
doctrine down to the task level. To facilitate a searchable doctrine database, the task level 
of doctrine has been determined as the appropriate level at which to store data. At this 
level,  doctrine is broken  down to  its  smallest  stand-alone components.     These 
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components can be combined with other doctrine components to synthesize "user-defined 
doctrine." The database can be created using NMETL as the basisi for XML data tags to 
define the data. 
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V.        CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       CONCLUSIONS 
The primary focus of this study was to determine whether or not the Navy has 
created a more dynamic development process for doctrine with Web-Enabled Doctrine. 
A comparison of today's doctrine process to past doctrine processes in the Navy reveals 
significant advances towards this goal. There are some aspects of today's doctrine 
process that very closely resemble a dynamic process, but there are other aspects where 
there is still progress to be made. 
The well-defined doctrine development process that exists within the Doctrine 
department at NWDC is one of the brightest points in this study. The first step in process 
improvement is outlining and describing the steps of the process. This acts as the starting 
point for analysis of the process and the identification of areas for improvement. Having 
taken this step, the Doctrine department has set the machinery of change in motion. 
Another positive indicator of a dynamic process is the identification in the NWDC 
command process of the need for inter-departmental cooperation. Current leadership at 
NWDC is fostering such interaction. The establishment of the WISB, WIDTs, and 
CODE teams provide important mechanisms for developing synergistic relationships 
between departments that must exist in a dynamic process. 
The Navy Doctrine Working Party is another important component in the dynamic 
development process. The NDWP involves operational and developmental Navy leaders 
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together in frank doctrinal discussions. These individuals must sell doctrine to the fleets. 
There must, of course, be top-level buy in at the highest levels of the Navy, but it is the 
operational commander that must indoctrinate his forces. The voice that these leaders 
gain through the NDWP increases their ownership stake and level of trust in doctrine. 
When these leaders believe in the doctrine they have helped to create, they will sell it to 
their sailors. 
The concept of Web-Enabled Doctrine represents a fundamental change in the 
doctrine development process and a marked shift towards the creation of a dynamic 
development process. Never in the history of the Navy has the Fleet had such a voice in 
the doctrine process. The naval messages and periodic reviews of the past were 
inadequate methods of receiving timely input from the fleet. If sailors had a comment to 
make on a doctrinal or tactical publication, they were forced to generate official 
correspondence and run it through their chain of command. This administrative burden 
stifled much input. Web-Enabled Doctrine allows sailors a constantly available, real time 
method for making doctrinal inputs. This allows for current issues to be addressed and 
increases Fleet ownership of doctrine. 
The one area that hinders the process is accessibility. As discussed before, a large 
portion of the fleet is unable to access the Web-Enabled Doctrine due to the SIPRNET 
only access. This situation, if not rectified, could lead to disenfranchisement and a lack 
of interest in the doctrine process. All operational commands need assured access to this 
system if it is to reach its full potential as a means of collection and dissemination for 
doctrine development. 
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B.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
The doctrine development process is in the process of becoming a more dynamic 
undertaking. As a result, there are few recommendations that can be made along these 
lines. Many of the key issues for process improvement have already been identified, but 
bear repeating at this time. 
The quick implementation of Web-Enabled Doctrine provided a basic capability 
for web-accessible doctrine. This capability must be expanded in accordance with the 
Web-Based Navy architecture. The migration of the NWEL database from .pdf data 
format to XML formatted data should be accomplished expeditiously. The NMETL 
system provides a baseline for the construction the data type dictionary necessary for the 
database migration and should be employed in that manner. The new NWEL databases 
should be maintained at the authoritative data centers with remote databases located 
aboard afloat units. The databases aboard afloat units can be updated during times of low 
bandwidth use. 
The use of application servers and application service providing software should 
continue. Similar to the databases, scaled-down application servers should be placed 
aboard afloat units to provide application functionality when connectivity is not available. 
The employment of XML and the three-tiered architecture will improve access to the 
most current publications at all units. 
The final recommendation for the Navy's doctrine process is that it be marketed 
extensively.   The Fleet must be involved in the development process and must have 
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access to the final products of the process. The only way that this will occur is if the 
sailors at sea know about the system. A single message announcing the activation of the 
system does not provide enough visibility. Awareness of the system and the doctrine 
process must be increased Navy-wide. A series of articles in warfare community and 
service magazines along with continued message traffic could provide the necessary 
exposure. 
C.       SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
This study provides a broad-brush approach to the topic of doctrine in the Navy. 
As a result, there are several areas of this study that lend themselves to expansion for 
further studies. Some of these areas are discussed below. 
Web-Enabled Doctrine is a very new system. It has been online for less than two 
months. Very little data has been collected on exactly how much it is being used by the 
fleet. The system has yet to be incorporated into an NDWP meeting cycle. Much study is 
required to see how it is affecting the process. 
The migration of Web-Enabled Doctrine databases is an enormous undertaking. 
The creation of data type dictionaries for the new XML databases is a key issue. A 
feasibility study on the use of NMETLs for this purpose is appropriate. 
Another area that requires study is in assessing the fleet's use of doctrine. A 
survey type study of the Fleet, education centers, and centers of excellence could be 
conducted to determine where doctrine is employed the most and by which method it is 
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accessed (hard copy publications, NWEL CDs, web). The survey could also determine 
which levels of doctrine are accessed and used the most (basic, operational, tactical). 
This study touched very lightly on the organization of NWDC and its Doctrine 
department. An organizational analysis of NWDC and each of its component 
departments could provide unique insight into the command and its processes. A 
task/organization analysis could be conducted to determine whether the current structure 
of NWDC is the best for the doctrine process. 
These areas represent only a few of the avenues for study in Navy doctrine. It has 
been a topic long taken for granted in the Navy. Increased study of the topic can only 
lead to a better understanding and better implementation of doctrine in the Navy. 
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APPENDIX 
The following list of questions was utilized as a basis for the semi-structured 
interviews conducted with former and current NWDC personnel to gather information on 
the doctrine development process. This list does not include all questions asked. 
Additional questions were asked to clarify answers and explore issues at a deeper level of 
detail. 
Interview Script: 
Good Morning/Afternoon, I'm LT Joe Fauth. I am currently an Information 
Technology Management graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. 
The purpose of this interview is to gather information for my thesis on The Web-Based 
Doctrine Development Tool: A Step in the Evolution of Dynamic Doctrine. 
This research will focus on the history of the naval doctrine process, its current 
state, and how the WBDDT could affect the process. 
I will be taping the interview so that I can accurately record your answers for use 
in the research. If at any time you do not want to answer a question or want to go off the 
record feel free to stop the cassette. The interview should last between 45-60 minutes. 
Before we begin, do you have any questions for me? 
Introductory Questions 
• Position/Job Title? 
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• 
Time in Position? 
Tasks that you are responsible for? 
Any special background info on yourself? 
What are some key events that you feel have impacted your 
position/department at NWDC, and what was the impact? 
Doctrine Definition and History 
• How do you define doctrine? 
• How do you describe the line between doctrine and TTP? 
• How do you define dynamic doctrine? 
• What is your perspective of the history of naval doctrine? 
• What role has history and tradition played in shaping today's doctrine 
process? 
• Are you familiar with the circumstances surrounding the establishment of 
NDC? If so, what is your perspective on those circumstances? Its 
organization? Its processes? 
• Are you familiar with the circumstances surrounding the establishment of 
NWDC? If so, what is your perspective on them? 
• What is you understanding of NWDC s mission and purpose? 
• What final products come out of NWDC? 
• Who are NWDC's customers, specifically? 
Organization 
• Who are the key stakeholders/actors/groups involved with NWDC? 
• How do they interact with NWDC ? Which have the biggest impact? 
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Are there any conflicts between the key stakeholders' expectations and the 
products delivered by NWDC? 
Describe the shape/structure of the organization at NWDC. 
Which parts of the organization are involved in the doctrine 
development/review process? 
How closely is reviewing old doctrine related to generating new doctrine? 
Is there any mechanism currently in place for fleet input on doctrine 
issues? How closely is NLLS related to the process? 
Ideally, where should the input come from? 
Describe the doctrine process flow. 
What Procedural/Physical/Personal obstacles hinder this flow? 
Do you have the tools available to accomplish the tasks that are required? 
Do you have the manpower available to accomplish the tasks that are 
required? IT personnel for WBDDT? 
What part of the process works best? 
What would you change about the process? 
Tell me a doctrine process success story. Why was it a success? 
Tell me a doctrine process failure story. Why was it a failure? 
Web-Based Doctrine Development Tool 
What is the envisioned function of the WBDDT? 
Can you give a brief technical description of the WBDDT? Software? 




Are there any technical problems that might hinder the WBDDT's 
functionality? 
Are there accessibility problems? 
Where does the WBDDT fit in the current process? 
Do you think the process will change as a result of implementing the 
WBDDT? Ifso,inwhatway? 
Wrap-Up Questions 
Now that you have a better idea of what I am looking for, are there any 
questions that I should have asked, but did not? 
Do you know of anyone not on my interview list that I should talk with? 
Are there any publications, manuals, articles, instructions that I should 
read to gain a better understanding of anything we have discussed today? 
Is there anything that you would like to clarify or add? 
Thank you for your time. If I need to call you at a later date to fill in some 
more information is that okay and what is the best way to contact you? 
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